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Abstract
AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY: ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND GUILT
by
WILLIAM EDWARD CROZIER
Advisor: Deryn Strange
Both real-life cases and laboratory research demonstrate that confession evidence is
very convincing—even when it should not be. Could this be due to an automatic association
between a confession and guilt? We1 tested this possibility using a Deese-RoedigerMcDermott (DRM) list, which measures automatic associations by presenting participants
with a list of words that are thematically related but, importantly, lack the word describing
the theme (“critical lure”). When the association between the list words and the theme is
sufficiently strong, participants incorrectly report seeing the critical lure. We hypothesized
that participants would show more false recall for seeing “guilty” on a “guilty”-themed DRM
list when the list included evidence that is automatically associated with guilt, such as
“confession” and “DNA.” Although our previous research on this topic found no significant
effects, we addressed limitations of that research in three studies using an Amazon
MechanicalTurk sample. Our first study addressed a possible ceiling effect by decreasing
the associative strength of our “guilty” list. Our second study increased external validity by

Because research is a collaborative endeavor, and this project would not have been
possible without my advisor’s support and contribution, I have chosen to use the pronoun
“we” throughout my dissertation. I think it is the most accurate characterization of this
work.
1
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presenting our DRM List as a DRM Story—a narrative format that provides context for the
list words. Our third study investigated the effects of priming evidence quality on the
association to guilty.
Overall, we found little support for our hypotheses. Across all three studies, we did
not detect any effects of the evidence type (Study 1, 2, and 3) or prime type (Study 3). We
did, however, find several interesting trends in the data. We discuss explanations for the
lack of significant findings and address directions for future research. Specifically, adapting
this paradigm for other research applications and to increase our understanding of the
memorial effects of the “guilty” DRM list.
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CHAPTER 1: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND GUILT
At trial, a particular piece of evidence against a defendant typically suggests, but
does not determine, guilt. Careful consideration should forge the association between
evidence and guilt. That is, as a juror reasons through the facts of a case, they should be
evaluating whether the evidence presented (both individual pieces and the body of
evidence as a whole) is consistent with the defendant being guilty. But, what if the
association between evidence and guilt is automatic rather than the result of careful
decision-making? For example, if a juror simply hears “confession” do they automatically
think and remember “guilty”?
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the association between confession and guilt may
indeed be automatic. In its first 325 DNA exonerations, the Innocence Project found that 88
of these cases (27%) were due, in part or whole, to a false confession or false admission
(www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction). Thus, in this group of
exonerations, someone involved in a criminal investigation—a detective, a district
attorney, a prosecutor, a judge, a juror, or any combination therein—may have ignored
potentially exonerating evidence and instead believed the confession. What about the
confession—a form of evidence prone to error (Kassin et al., 2010)—made it so convincing,
especially in the cases where there was contradictory DNA?
Consider a specific example: the Central Park Five case. On an April night in 1989, a
female jogger was found brutally beaten and raped in Central Park. Police quickly rounded
up a group of teenage boys seen roaming the Park earlier in the evening. Of those taken in
for questioning, five (Yusef Salaam, Kevin Richardson, Antron McCray, Raymond Santana,
and Korey Wise) confessed to the crime, saying the five of them assaulted the victim alone.
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Eventually, police compared DNA recovered from a rape kit performed on the jogger to all
five of the confessors and found no matches (www.innocenceproject.org/cases-falseimprisonment/Korey-Wise). At this point, logic should dictate the teenagers’ confessions
and descriptions of the crime were all factually inaccurate, and thus the police should
search for a new perpetrator. Instead, the district attorney charged the five confessors with
the crime. And at trial, the jury made the same mistake: rather than question the lack of a
DNA match, they were swayed by the confessions and found all five teenagers guilty.
Laboratory research has also demonstrated the power of a confession. Kassin and
Neumann (1997) found mock jurors are most likely to convict when a confession is
present, compared to cases with an incriminating eyewitness or an incriminating character
statement. Furthermore, when mock jurors read a case containing all of these forms of
evidence, they rated the confession as being the most incriminating. Problematically,
research has also shown that confessions are persuasive—even when they should not be.
To test whether a confession impacts a trial decision even if it should be ignored, Kassin
and Sukel (1997) asked participants to read a trial transcript which contained no
confession (control), or a confession from a fully-crossed 2(interrogation pressure: low,
high) x 2(confession: admissible, inadmissible) design. If jurors could indeed ignore an
improper confession in determining guilt, then only those jurors reading a case with a lowpressure admissible confession should convict at a higher rate than the no-confession
control group. This hypothesis is based on the theory that a juror should understand an
inadmissible confession or a confession produced from a high-pressure interrogation could
lead to a false confession. Thus, a juror should ignore such a confession in their decisionmaking process. Instead, all of the participants who read a case with a confession were
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more likely to convict than the control group. While the low-pressure admissible
confession group convicted the most (63% of participants), the low-pressure inadmissible
(50%) and high-pressure admissible (50%) and high-pressure inadmissible (46%) groups
were all significantly higher than the no-confession control (19%). Furthermore,
participants rated admissible confessions and low-pressure confessions as more influential
in their decision than the inadmissible- or high-pressure-counterparts. Thus, the
confession continued to affect participants’ decision making even when it should have been
ignored—and it did so without participants’ conscious awareness. Unfortunately, the
overriding power of a confession is not just limited to lay people. Recruiting 132 active
judges, Wallace and Kassin (2012) found that even they were vastly more likely to convict
if a confession was present— even when the interrogation resulting in the confession was
described as high-pressure, and despite the fact that the judges rated high-pressure
confessions as less voluntary.
In a recent review of confession and interrogation research, Kassin (2012)
investigated whether false confessions corrupt the truth-seeking process. He described
archival data that suggests defendants who confessed are more likely to have a bad defense
attorney (Kassin & Kukucka, 2012) and are more likely to plead guilty (Redlich, 2010) than
exonerees who had not confessed. With this body of research in mind, we wondered
whether it is possible that a confession could also corrupt the truth-finding process at an
individual, cognitive level. Perhaps the reason an improper confession is so difficult to
exclude from a juror’s guilt decision-making process is because a confession suggests guilt
so strongly that the confession is automatically and unconsciously associated with guilt —
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and that automatic association is all but impossible to break. That is the proposition we
address in this set of studies.
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CHAPTER 2: TESTING FOR AUTOMATIC ASSOCIATIONS
The Implicit Associations Test
When psychologists want to measure automatic associations, perhaps the most
prominent paradigm that comes to mind is the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). As its name implies, the IAT measures implicit associations by
measuring how long it takes participants to categorize specific stimuli (i.e., African
American names) into a proper category (Black names or White names) that is
simultaneously paired with a seemingly unrelated category (Pleasant or Unpleasant).
When participants take longer to categorize the stimuli into one classification (an African
American name into the Black/Pleasant category) than another (African American names
into the Black/Unpleasant category) they are said to have a preference for the shorterresponse group. Although the IAT has been an incredibly fruitful paradigm, measuring a
multitude of implicit attitudes and associations—such as race (Greenwald et al., 1998),
gender (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003), voter behavior (Arcuri, Castelli, Galdi,
Zogmaister, & Amadori, 2008), attitudes towards alcohol (Houben & Wiers, 2006) and
smoking (Huijding, de Jong, Wiers, & Verkooijen, 2005), consumer behavior (Maison,
Greenwald, & Bruin, 2004), gender and math (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), and even
as a questionably-effective tool to detect false memories (Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister,
Ferrerra, & Castiello, 2008; but see Takarangi & Strange, 2013)—we do not believe it is the
best paradigm to test our question. The IAT has several theoretical problems and
implication limitations that render it unsuitable for this research project. For example,
although the IAT does reliably produce a difference in response times, it is still a matter of
debate as to what that difference means. Indeed, Blanton and Jaccard (2006) refer to the
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IAT as arbitrary, because it relies on (among other issues), millisecond metrics to measure
bias, norming, and arbitrary zero points such that understanding differences in results
requires a certain amount of interpretation. Moreover, Fiedler, Messner, and Bluemke
(2006) found that the association model underpinning the IAT is questionable and, perhaps
most relevant to this project, differences in IAT scores between individuals are ambiguous
and hard to interpret (e.g., arbitrary zero points). These issues lead to a number of
practical problems for this particular project. First, the IAT paradigm would be extremely
difficult to modify. The IAT measures response times between two general concepts, such
as “violent” and a racial group, averaged over many trials. The necessity of many repeated
trials means that participants must view and respond to multiple iterations of the
concept/association pairings—for example, twenty different photographs of African
American males paired with ten “pleasant” and ten “unpleasant” stimuli. Because “guilty” is
a specific concept that would be difficult to uniquely represent several times over, the IAT
would be extremely difficult to adapt here; showing twenty African-American photographs
is far easier than representing “guilty” in twenty different ways. Furthermore, it would
require an extraordinarily large number of trials to compare guilty to different forms of
evidence (such as confessions, DNA, etc.) to detect automatic associations. Second, the IAT
would prove difficult to modify for follow-up studies as it is built in a very specific way and
offers little flexibility in its construction and measurement. Finally, and perhaps most
critical to our purposes, the IAT does not address memory. Although the IAT measures
implicit associations, a paradigm that could also measure how people apply that
association in a more directly-observable manner, would be much more useful.
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The Deese-Roediger-McDermott Paradigm
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) provides a novel way of testing potentially automatic associations in a
legal context. Not only is it a much easier and more adaptable paradigm to implement (see
below for its variety of research applications), it also relies on existing semantic knowledge
networks and allows us to directly measure how people relate specific concepts through
false recall formation. As such, we can observe how people relate certain forms of evidence
to “guilty” as well as gain insight into how the resulting false memories may influence
future decisions and judgments.
The methodology for the DRM paradigm is straightforward: participants view or
hear a list of words that are related to a concept, or theme. However, the theme itself is not
included in the list. This strongly-related, excluded word is referred to as the “critical lure.”
For example, participants read: rest, doze, snore bed…, but not the critical lure “sleep.”
Then, after a short delay to allow the list to pass out of short-term memory, researchers
test participants’ memory for the list items, either by a) asking participants to recall all of
the words they can remember in two minutes, or b) a recognition task for list words, new
words, and the critical lure wherein participants rate whether a word is “Old” or “New,”
and rate their confidence in their response. Furthermore, if “Old” is selected, participants
categorize their memory as either a “remember” judgment (strong, vivid memory with
specific details), a “know” memory (a general sense of familiarity), or a “guess” judgment.
Research shows that participants will report having seen the critical lure, for a
variety of list-themes, ranging from 27% (the king list) to 80% (sleep list) of the time on the
recognition test (Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995). The phenomenological aspects of
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the falsely recalled lure can also be similar to those for list words. For example, Read
(1996) used the sleep DRM list and found that participants were just as likely to report
having seen “sleep” on the list as they were any of the words actually presented. Overall,
participants reported significantly different confidence ratings and “remember” judgments
(signifying clear, strong memories) for the “sleep” critical lure and the list words. However,
when participants estimated that the critical lure appeared in the first third of the list
(compared to those that estimated the middle third or last third), confidence ratings and
“remember” judgments were nearly identical for the critical lure and the list words.
Activation-Monitoring Theory
How does the DRM paradigm create such robust false recall? According to the
activation-monitoring theory, people falsely recall the critical lure due to a combination of
activating the concept, followed by committing a source monitoring error (Roediger &
McDermott, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). As a
person reads the list words, the topic to which they are all related is “activated” by one of
two processes. According to the spreading activation account, the semantically-related list
words cue the semantic network to which the critical lure belongs (Collins & Loftus, 1975).
Subsequently, the critical lure is activated: Either the reader consciously thinks of the
critical lure, as in “all of these words remind me of sleep” or without awareness, by which
the reader thinks of the concept of sleep without realizing it. Alternatively, fuzzy-trace
theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998) explains that as a person reads the list, they construct a
gist representation of the list, which describes the properties and features common to all of
the list words. The critical lure is also activated because it shares many of these features
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with the gist trace. However, as Gallo (2010) points out, these two processes are extremely
similar, not mutually exclusive, and amount to the same end: activation of the critical lure.
Next, at test, the person must engage in a source monitoring decision to determine
the source of the activated critical lure (e.g., sleep; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993;
Lindsay, 2008). When attempting to determine whether they have seen a specific word on
the preceding list, people must access their memory for the list itself. When a word is not
related to the list topic and was therefore not on the list (such as “lawyer” for the sleep list)
it is easy to reject. However, when evaluating the source of the critical lure, which has been
previously activated, a person must choose between an internal source (thinking about the
word) and an external source (reading the word). When they falsely remember seeing the
critical lure, they have committed a source monitoring error; they attribute their thinking
of the critical lure to reading the word on the list.
At its heart, the DRM paradigm is a memory test. However, it relies on the strength
of the semantic relationship between a critical lure and a topic — the stronger the
relationship, the higher the false recall (or recognition) rate for the critical lure. Put
another way, if the list words are sufficiently semantically related to the critical lure, that
list will produce false recall. If, however, the list words do not relate to the critical lure, the
list will fail to activate the network and participants will be less likely to falsely recall the
word. Indeed, research has found a positive correlation between the associative strength of
the list words to the critical lure, and the false recall of the critical lure: the more strongly
associated the list, the more likely you are to see the DRM effect (Gallo, 2010; Roediger et
al, 2001; Deese, 1959).
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The DRM paradigm has been adapted in a number of ways to study memory more
broadly, such as providing support for a dual-process memory model (Barnhardt, Choi,
Gerkens, & Smith, 2006), studying development of memory in children (Metzger et al.,
2008), memory in Alzheimer’s patients (Balota et al., 1999; Watson, Balota, & SergentMarshall, 2001), memory in PTSD patients (Brennen, Dybdahl, & Kapidzic, 2006;
Hauschildt, Peters, Jelinek, & Moritz, 2012), and even measuring individual differences for
false memory susceptibility (Blair, Lenton, & Hastie, 2002) — not to mention increasing
our understanding of general true and false memory processes and how those processes
develop (e.g., Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roeidger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001;
Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004; Barnhardt, Choi, Gerkens, & Smith, 2006; Brainerd, Yang,
Reyna, Howe, & Mills, 2008; Sugrue, Strange, & Hayne, 2009).
Using the DRM to Measure Automatic Semantic Associations
The DRM paradigm can also be used to measure the semantic relationship between
a list of words and the central concept due to its reliance on spreading activation within a
semantic network. The more often a DRM list generates false recall for the critical lure, the
greater the association between the lure and activated concept. If any alterations are made
to the list words, any increase (or decrease) in the critical lure false recall rate is due to that
alteration strengthening (or weakening) the semantic association. Similarly, any primes or
stereotypes that activate related networks can also influence how often people false alarm
to the critical lure. For example, Lenton, Blair, and Hastie (2001) found that participants
were more likely to false alarm to a stereotypical male job or trait (i.e., engineer and wise)
when viewing a list constructed of other stereotypical male jobs than when viewing a list of
stereotypical female jobs. However, when viewing the stereotypical female jobs list,

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

11

participants false alarmed to female jobs and traits (dancer and delicate) more than
stereotypical-male roles and traits. Furthermore, when participants were primed with a list
of either male traits or female traits before viewing the male-job or female-job list, they
showed greater false alarm rates when viewing the gender-associated list.
Takarangi, Polaschek, Hignett, and Garry (2007) also demonstrated that priming
and individual differences can affect how we interpret a DRM list. In their study, when
participants were shown an ambiguous list (words such as beat, batter, punch, etc. that
could either be violent words or kitchen/food words), those who were primed to be more
hostile, or were high in trait hostility, false alarmed to more non-ambiguous violent words
(e.g., stab) than those low in state or trait hostility. Takarangi et al. explained that this
higher false alarm rate was likely due to the strength of the violent-interpretation network
being activated. Those who were more hostile were more likely to see the ambiguous list
words in a hostile, violent way, and thus activated the unambiguously-violent critical lure.
Therefore, because we know priming specific information can influence the semantic
activation that leads to a DRM false alarm, we reasoned that it may be a useful tool to
employ in the proposed studies. More specifically, could we introduce information about
legitimate or wrongful convictions hinging on specific evidence via priming to strengthen
or weaken that evidences’ association with guilt?
Because the associative strength of the list correlates with the critical lure, we
should be able to use a DRM list to measure the associative relationship between different
forms of evidence (the words on the list) and “guilty” as a critical lure. By creating a DRM
list for the critical lure “guilty” and including different forms of evidence in the list, we
should be able to use the rate of false recall for “guilty” to measure how closely each form of
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evidence is associated with “guilty.” That is, if a piece of evidence, such as “confession,” is
automatically strongly associated with guilty, then the semantic activation would be
stronger than the basic list, thereby increasing false recall for the critical lure. Conversely, if
a form of evidence is more weakly associated with guilty, the semantic activation would
decrease compared to the basic list, and thereby generate less false recall.
Although confessions are an obvious candidate for evidence that might be
automatically associated with guilt, there are certainly others. We suspect that evidence
that is generally perceived to be highly reliable and highly accurate will be more likely to
lead to a guilty verdict, and thus more strongly associated with guilt; the weaker the
perception of the evidence, the weaker the association should be. For example, DNA is a
form of evidence that we expect would be strongly associated with guilt, given that it has
been scientifically developed and validated as reliable and accurate (albeit, not entirely free
of error; Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008; National Academy of Sciences, 2009).
Indeed, Lawson (2014) found that participants rated DNA evidence as being highly reliable
(4.75 on a 1-5 Likert Scale). Importantly, participants rated DNA as more reliable than
other forms of forensic evidence, including fingerprints (reliability = 4.33), bitemarks
(3.89), toolmarks (3.58), and eyewitnesses (2.84) — a finding supported by Lieberman et
al., (2008) and Hans, Kaye, Dann, Farley, and Albertson, (2011). Together, these ratings
offer comparative forms of evidence for testing guilt associations. For example, eyewitness
evidence is viewed as less reliable, likely because it is not scientific and is prone to error
(National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells et al., 1998). As such, eyewitness evidence
should be weakly associated with guilty and a good comparison for confessions which are
similarly not the result of scientific analysis. On the other hand, fingerprint analysis is
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similar to DNA in that it is scientific and perceived as fairly reliable, but, unlike DNA, not
scientifically validated and thus more prone to error (National Academy of Sciences, 2009).
Therefore, fingerprints should be associated with guilt, but not to the same extent as DNA.
Likewise, bitemark analysis, despite its reputation, is not scientific, not validated, and
prone to error (National Academy of Sciences, 2014) and has been the subject of significant
negative media attention (Balko, 2015a, 2015b). Thus it should be weakly associated with
guilt. Together, these forms of evidence represent a possible spectrum of guilt association,
ranging from DNA (strong) to eyewitness (weak).
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPING AND TESTING A “GUILTY” DRM LIST
In our initial tests employing the DRM paradigm to measure associations between
guilt and evidence, we successfully created a 14-word “Guilty” DRM list. We had 60
participants from Amazon MechanicalTurk (MTurk) complete a forward associative task
for the word “guilty.” They listed the first 10 words that came to mind when they read
“guilty.” From these data, we chose the 14 most commonly reported words (excluding
vague words, such as “bad;” See Appendix A)—which ranged from being listed 47% of the
time (“jury”) to 10% of the time (“verdict” and “sentence”)—and tested whether a short (7
words) or long (14 words) list produced false recall of “guilty.” Forty-five participants read
the list of words (presented for 1.5 seconds each), completed a 5-minute interference task,
then completed an OLD or NEW recognition test and rated their confidence in each decision
(1=not at all confident, 5=very confident). Participants were assigned to the 7-word list
(N=20) or a 15-word list condition (N=25). All read the “sleep” list, the “chair” list
(established DRM lists that we used as control comparisons) and the “guilty” list. We found
that the word “guilty” was falsely recalled about 70% of the time, regardless of the list
length (M7-word=.70; M14-word=.71), which is in line with our DRM control lists; “sleep” was
falsely recalled 89% of the time (M7-word=.90; M14-word=.88); “chair” was falsely recalled 79%
of the time (M7-word=.85; M14-word=.75). Thus, our “guilty” list reliably produced a high rate
of false recall.
With a functioning “Guilty” DRM list, we then tested our primary research question:
are different forms of evidence more strongly associated with guilt than others? To do so,
we removed the last word (which is also the most weakly-associated word) and placed one
of four types of evidence into the 7th position in the list, creating four new lists to test
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between subjects. These forms of evidence were: “confession,” “DNA,” “bitemark,” and
“eyewitness.” Participants were sorted into one of five conditions: a Control List condition,
which read the basic “guilty” DRM list; a Confession List condition, which read the list
containing “confession” as the 7th word; a DNA List condition; a Bitemark List condition;
and finally an Eyewitness List condition. Based on the convincing nature of confession
evidence (see Chapter 1), we hypothesized that participants in the Confession List
condition would show significantly more false recall than all of the other conditions, save
the DNA List condition. We further hypothesized that participants in the DNA List condition
would show an increased false recall occurrence, similar to those in the Confession List
condition, due to the fact that DNA evidence is scientifically reliable and widely used in
court (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). Conversely, we expected the Bitemark List
condition (evidence that is regarded as “scientific” but is not accepted by the National
Academy of Sciences as reliable; National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Garrett & Neufeld,
2009) and the Eyewitness List condition (evidence that is prone to error and not regarded
as scientific; National Academy of Sciences, 2014; Wells et al., 1998) to show fewer false
recall for “guilty” than our strong-evidence conditions.
We recruited 699 participants from MTurk across three samples and assigned them
to one of the five conditions (Control List N=146; Confession List N=151; DNA List N=159;
Bitemark List N=148; and Eyewitness List N=95, smaller because we did not include it in
our first sample). Surprisingly, we found no significant differences between groups (X2(4,
N=699)=4.59, p=.332; all pair-wise comparisons between groups were not significant,
p>.05). However, we did find that participants reported reading "guilty” at consistently
high rates: MControl=0.73, 95%CI=[0.68,0.82]; MConfession=0.82, 95%CI=[0.75,0.88];
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MDNA=0.82, 95%CI=[0.76,0.87]; MBitemark=0.85, 95%CI=[0.79,0.90]; MEyewitness=0.78,
95%CI=[0.69,0.86]. Moreover, a one-way ANOVA on people’s confidence ratings for
reading “guilty” revealed that although the overall test was not significant (p>.05),
participants in the Confession List group were more confident in their false recall of “guilty”
than those in the Control List group (t(132)=1.98, p=.049, d=0.258; MConfession=4.35,
95%CI=[4.20,4.45]; MControl=4.11, 95%CI=[3.92,4.30]) and DNA List group (t(152)=2.24,
p=.026, d=0.283; MConfession=4.35, 95%CI=[4.20,4.45]; MDNA=4.09, 95%CI=[3.92,4.26]).
Based on these data, we can conclude two things. First, manipulating the list to
include specific forms of evidence did not seem to change the list’s activation strength of
guilty. However, our results do seem to show an interesting trend. The lists containing
evidence forms did generate more false alarms to “guilty” than the control list.
Interestingly, the Eyewitness List did not generate as much false recall as the other evidence
lists, likely due to its perceived weakness as a type of evidence (Lieberman, et al. 2008;
Hans et al., 2011). The Bitemark List, however, produced high rates of false recall—rates in
line with the Confession and DNA lists—which may be due to a lack of knowledge regarding
the unreliability of bitemark evidence (National Academy of Sciences, 2009; Lawson,
2014). Second, although the types of evidence are not affecting how likely participants are
to false alarm to guilty, there is some evidence that the variations in evidence may be
affecting the phenomenological experience of the list. That is, people who read the
Confession List were more confident that they saw guilty than participants who saw other
forms of evidence. Despite the small effect size of these differences, we take this as
evidence that there is some connection between confession and guilty compared to other
forms of evidence.
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Another reason to warrant further investigation with the “guilty” DRM list lies in the
list’s pragmatic implication. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the DRM effect occurs when people
(intentionally or unintentionally) connect all of the list words and semantically activate the
theme—the critical lure. Our DRM list certainly seems to operate according to this
mechanism. However, a body of research beyond the DRM paradigm provides insight into
the false recall created by the “guilty” list. Work on pragmatic implication has
demonstrated people can falsely remember implied, but not stated, ideas. Although this
work has studied paragraph stimuli rather than lists, a similar mechanism may apply here.
The criminal justice words on our list, such as “judge,” “jury,” “crime,” and “trial,” may
pragmatically imply guilt causing people to falsely remember that implication as being a
part of what they saw. Indeed, Bransford and Johnson (1971) found that participants
would remember more information than was originally stated, or misattribute the source
of that information, as a result of integrating the content of topically-related sentences.
Chan and McDermott (2006) note that the pragmatic implications of a message
necessarily change the meaning of the original message. For example, participants who
read “The baby stayed awake all night” later false alarmed to “The baby cried all night”
65% of the time. Of course, while babies do stay awake crying, they could be awake for a
number of other reasons that do not require an upset infant. Further, they found that when
a message was strongly implied—but not outright stated—participants remembered that
message just as strongly as presented information. The implication here is that even
though our list words should be guilt-neutral, people understand them to imply guilt.
Indeed, such automatic association underlines the importance of further understanding
this process. People should be innocent until proven guilty—not automatically guilty. For
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example, innocent and guilty people go before a judge, a jury, and have a trial. Further, the
word “innocent” —the opposite of guilty—appears on the list. However, these words
activate the justice system—a fixture of society that is both unique and familiar. Because
the justice system’s courts are specifically designed to assess guilt, the unavoidable
activation of guilt adds an additional level to the DRM semantic activation.
Given the mixed results from our previous work and the contextual richness of the
concept of “guilty,” we designed a series of studies to further explore the usefulness of the
DRM paradigm in detecting automatic associations between evidence and guilt.
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CHAPTER 4: PROPOSED RESEARCH PLAN
Although our hypotheses were not generally supported in our preliminary work, the
small effect we observed for Confession List confidence suggested this paradigm may still
be useful. Indeed, there are at least two limitations we need to address. First, we suspected
there may be a ceiling effect for our “guilty” DRM list. The Control List generates false recall
for “guilty” in 73% of participants; a rate that places it with some of the most successful
DRM lists in lure activation. Although not statistically different from Control, we see that
the Confession List and the DNA List appeared to generate slightly higher rates of false
recall (82% of participants for both lists). Although it may be that there is no difference in
associative strength between the three lists and “guilty,” another explanation is plausible:
the Control List association is already so strong that the addition of even more strongly
associated words (“confession” and “DNA”) does little to increase the association.
Therefore, we addressed this possible ceiling effect in two ways. First, a shorter list could
create a situation in which removal of the last word (the 7th word, compared to the 14th
word in our previous study) would decrease the associative strength of the list more than
our current 14-word list. Second, it is possible that some of our words were so strongly
associated with guilt (the words at the beginning of the list) that the latter words did little
to increase the association. Therefore, it may be possible to address the ceiling effect by
using words that are more weakly associated with guilty, which would make the variations
in guilt association between evidence types more detectable. Thus, a shorter list with more
weakly associated words would be more sensitive to the associative strength of a single list
word, thereby amplifying the associative strength of our evidence types. We test this
hypothesis in Study 1.

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

20

A second important limitation to our prior work is the lack of context. Given the
applied nature of our research question, we cannot ignore the possibility that situational
context and previous knowledge would play a role in how a real juror would associate
evidence with guilt. Reading a list of 7 or 14 criminal justice words is a far cry from an
actual trial. Interestingly, Dewhurst, Pursglove, and Lewis (2007) demonstrated the DRM
effect with a paragraph, rather than a list. The paragraph—termed a “DRM story”—placed
the 14 list words in a narrative of 65-104 words, depending on the list. They developed this
method to test children’s automatic associations. Children do not tend to show the DRM
effect because they typically fail to make the semantic association between the list words
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002). The DRM story provides context for the list words and
makes the semantic association easier for the children to detect. As a result, they are more
likely to generate the critical lure than the original list approach. We adapted this “DRM
Story” paradigm to our “guilty list” to create a more context-rich situation. Thus, we
hypothesized that the increased context provided by the “DRM Story” would amplify the
automatic association between “guilt” and strong evidence forms. We tested a “guilty” DRM
Story format in Study 2.
Another important consideration regarding the issue of context is what people come
into the study knowing about each form of evidence. So far, we have relied on participants’
existing knowledge-base. However, in a real case, the quality of the evidence plays a large
role in how guilt is determined—good evidence (correctly gathered and analyzed) is far
more likely to lead to a guilty verdict than bad evidence. Indeed, the quality of evidence
(both general and for a specific piece of evidence in a specific case) is the type of contextual
information that would be discussed in an actual case. Evidence quality information is also
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akin to another real-world form of context—pretrial publicity (Studebaker & Penrod,
1997). Trial-relevant information learned outside of the courtroom (e.g., through media
reports) can affect a variety of case-relevant judgments, such as defendant credibility and
guilt ratings. Such effects are the result of a source monitoring error, in which people
mistake what they learned pre-trial (which should be excluded from a juror’s consideration
of the case) for being learned during the trial itself (Ruva & McEvoy, 2008). This is
problematic for the chances of a fair trial, as only information learned during the trial is
subject to the rules of evidence and should therefore be the only information used when
determining a verdict. Although this project is not looking at pretrial publicity’s per se,
there are clear parallels. Whereas pretrial publicity context provides additional case “facts,”
priming evidence as should strengthen or weaken the relationship between evidence and
guilt, thereby altering how people think about guilt.
As such, in Study 3 we addressed whether pre-list priming—to frame the quality of
the evidence in the DRM list —strengthens or weakens the association between the
evidence and guilt.
Data Analysis Approach
Because we are using the DRM to measure semantic activation, we are primarily
interested in the differences between Evidence List groups. Thus, for the three studies we
will report the free recall, recognition, confidence, and Remember/Know/Guess results in
the main body. Other statistics of interest, but not experimental focus, are included in the
Appendices. For example, the memory measures for old words, new words, and the weak
lure for the “guilty” list and comparison DRM lists (“chair” for Study 1; “sleep” for Study 2)
are included in the Supplementary Statistics Appendices for the respective studies.
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Across all three experiments, Free Recall and Recognition Test results are submitted
to ANOVAs. Because these measures are dichotomous (e.g., “old” or “new”), these data are
traditionally submitted to chi-square analyses. We chose to report ANOVAs and t-tests for
two reasons. First, chi-square analyses yield the same significance values as ANOVAs and ttests. To this point, we analyzed our data both ways and include the chi-square results in
the Appendices for the respective study. Second, ANOVAs and t-tests are not entirely
inappropriate statistical tests, as we are attempting to compare the rates of false alarms per
group—which is a continuous variable. Indeed, we find that ANOVA results and effect sizes
are more intuitively understood than chi-square results and effect sizes.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1 – THE 7-WORD LIST
An alternate explanation of our original findings is that our Guilty list was so strong
that we observed a ceiling effect in the rate of critical lure false recall. The goal of this study
was to test the automatic associations between evidence and guilt with a control list that is
more weakly associated with “guilty.” To accomplish this, we decreased the list from a 14word list to a 7-word list and address the question: Do some forms of evidence show
greater automatic associations with guilt than others in a 7-word list? Traditionally, a DRM
list presents words in order of decreasing association: thus, the strongest-associated word
is presented first, and the weakest-associated word is presented last (Roediger &
McDermott, 1995; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). However, because it was our
goal to decrease the associative strength of our list, including the most strongly-associated
words may not be the best strategy. Therefore, which words we ultimately include in our 7word list is as important a consideration as the length of the list. We hypothesized that
shortening the list to 7-words by removing the three most strongly associated-words and
the 4 most weakly-associated words, false alarm rates to the critical lure will decrease
(Study 1a). Then, using this new 7-word list, we hypothesized participants in a Confession
List and DNA List condition would false alarm to the critical lure more than participants in
the Control List, Fingerprint List, and Eyewitness List conditions (Study 1b).
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CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1A
Design:
Between-subjects 3 group design (Relative Forward Associative Strength of the

Words: Words 1-7, strong association: 47%-24%; Words 4-10, medium association, 39%17%; Words 7-14, low association, 24%-10%; see Appendix A for List Words and their
Forward Associative Strength, and Appendix C for the word compositions of the lists).
Because the results of our first sample were surprising, we gathered a second sample to
replicate the findings. In this second sample, we included a fourth word list (a MediumStrong Association list, comprised of words 2-8, 44%-24% BAS), creating a 4 group design
(BAS of words: Strong Association; Medium-Strong Association; Medium Association; Weak
Association).
Participants:
Sample 1. We recruited 201 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 53 for failing to
follow directions (e.g., taking notes, engaging in another task, watching the word list (which
plays as a movie) more than once) and/or technical issues (e.g., the list failing to load,
Qualtrics crashing). For full exclusion criteria, see Appendix B. Thus, our final sample
included data from 148 participants (52 saw the Strong Association list; 44 the Medium
Association list; 52 the Weak Association list; imbalance due to exclusions). Participants
were 96 female, 52 male, with an average age of 37.38 (SD=11.19). English was the primary
language of all participants. Twenty-six held graduate degrees, 68 college degrees, and 54
high school diplomas.
Sample 2. We collected 251 MTurk workers. Of these, 50 were excluded, leaving 201
in our final analysis (46 Strong Association list; 52 Medium-Strong Association list; 53
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Medium Association list; 50 Weak Association list). Participants were 137 female, 64 male,
with an average age of 37.93 (SD=11.68). English was the primary language of all
participants. Twenty of the participants held graduate degrees, 90 a college degree, and 91
a high school diploma.
We hypothesized that weakening the associative strength of the list would have a
medium-sized effect on false alarm rates (d=0.5). Thus, we needed approximately 50
participants per cell to detect differences in the critical lure false alarm rate between lists
with 80% power and alpha=0.05.
Materials:
DRM Lists. Participants saw two 7-word DRM lists in a video: The “chair” list and the
“guilty” list, manipulated for forward associative strength (see Appendix A). Because the
“chair” list seemed to have rates comparable to our “guilty” list in pilot testing, we chose to
use this as a DRM memory control. We excluded the “sleep” list (that we have used in past
studies) because the false alarm rate is extremely high (and thus a weaker control than the
“chair” list) and a second control DRM list adds unnecessary time to the experiment.
The four lists we used (3 in Sample 1, all 4 in Sample 2) were derived from our
previous development of the “guilty” DRM list. The lists contained seven words from our
previous 14-word list. For a list of the word lists used in Study 1a, see Appendix C. For the
instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.
Procedure:
Participants were recruited via MTurk and directed to Qualtrics.com to complete the
survey. Participants completed two DRM lists (“chair” and “guilty”) with the following
components: first, participants watched a video presenting the 7-word list with each word
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presented for 1.5 seconds. Then, after a five-minute interference task, they entered as many
words as they could remember from the list in 2 minutes, our free recall measure. Next,
they completed a recognition test measure. It included words on the list (list words), words
not on the list (new words), and the unifying theme word (the critical lure: either chair or
guilty). For each of these words, participants responded whether the word was “Old” (on
the list) or “New” (not on the list) and rated their confidence for this decision on a 1-5
Likert scale. Finally, if participants rated the word as “Old” they were asked to categorize
their memory as “Remember” (the memory for the word is clear, with specific details),
“Know” (the participant does not remember specific details but has a general sense of
familiarity), or “Guess.” See Appendix L for the memory tests.
After watching the video and completing the memory tests for the “chair” list,
participants repeated this procedure for the “guilty” list. The “chair” and “guilty” lists
participants viewed were determined by random assignment, with participants placed into
the Strong Association group, Medium Association group, or Weak Association group
(between subjects; in Sample 2, a quarter of participants were placed into a Medium-Strong
Association group; Appendix C).
Hypotheses:
H1: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in false
alarm rates (both free recall and recognition). The strong association “guilty” list will
produce the most false alarms to “guilty,” followed by the medium association list, and
lastly the weak association list.
H2: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in
confidence rates for false alarms. The Strong Association “guilty” list will produce highest
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confidence for false alarms to “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list, and lastly
the Weak Association list.
H3: The association strength of the “guilty” list will generate differences in
remember/know/guess for false alarms. The Strong Association “guilty” list will produce
the most “remember” judgments for “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list, and
lastly the Weak Association list. Conversely, the Weak Association list will produce the most
“guess” judgments for “guilty,” followed by the Medium Association list and Strong
Association list.
Results:
Recognition Judgments. In Sample 1, the words that made up the “guilty” list did
have a significant impact on false recall rate for the critical lure, F(2, 145)=3.99, p=.021,
𝜂p2=0.052. The forward associative strength of the lists, however, had the opposite effect
than we predicted: Participants in the Strong Association list had the lowest false alarm rate
to “guilty” (MStrong=0.48, 95% CI=[0.34,0.62]), whereas participants in the Weak Association
List had the highest false alarm rate (MWeak=0.73, 95% CI=[0.61,0.86]) with participants in
the Medium Association list in the middle (MMedium=0.68, 95% CI=[0.54,0.83]). This trend
was not consistent with the “chair” list control, where the Strong Association list generated
the most false alarms (MStrong=0.79, 95% CI=[0.67,0.90]) compared to the Medium
(MMedium=0.59, 95% CI=[0.44,0.74]) and Weak (MWeak=0.63, 95% CI=[0.50,0.77]). Thus, it
seems that our “guilty” list is behaving differently from the “chair” list in the predictive
value of the forward associative strength on the DRM effect. Hence, we gathered a second
sample in order to replicate this trend.
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Sample 2 produced the same general trend as Sample 1. Recall that we introduced a
new list (words 2-8, the “Medium-Strong” list). The Medium-Strong list produced the lowest
rate of false recall (MMedium-Strong=0.44, 95% CI=[0.30,0.58]), followed by false alarm rates
similar to Sample 1 for the other lists: the Weak Association list with the most false alarms
(MWeak=0.70, 95% CI=[0.57,0.83]), followed by the Medium Association (MMedium=0.57, 95%
CI=[0.43,0.70]), and the Strong Association list (MStrong=0.50, 95% CI=[0.35,0.65]). There
was, however, no main effect of the list type (F(3, 197)=2.55, p=.057, likely due to the
minimal difference between the Medium-Strong and Strong lists.

Proportion Critical Lure FA
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Figure 1. Study 1a Proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test

Confidence Judgments. We submitted Confidence judgments for the “guilty” critical
lure to a one-way ANOVA. Sample 1 data showed a significant main effect of list strength,
F(2, 145)=6.14, p=.003, 𝜂p2=0.04. This main effect was driven by the fact that participants
who saw the Strong Association list were significantly more confident in their false alarms
(MStrong=4.13, 95% CI=[3.79,4.48]) than were participants who saw the Medium Association
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list (MMedium=3.61, 95% CI=[3.22,4.00]; t(94)=2.01, p=.047, d=0.415, 95% CI=[0.17,0.67]) or
participants who saw the Weak Association list (MWeak=3.58, 95% CI=[3.21,3.94];
t(102)=2.224, p=.028, d=0.43, 95% CI=[0.19,0.68]).
This finding did not replicate in Sample 2, however, because there was no main
effect for list type on confidence (p=.809), and there were no significant differences in
confidence for participants in the Strong Association list (MStrong=3.61, 95% CI=[3.28,3.94])
and any other lists.
Remember/Know/Guess Judgments. We submitted the R/K/G judgments to a chisquare test. For both Sample 1 and Sample 2, the chi square tests were not significant
(Sample 1: 𝛸2(4, N=93)=1.87, p=.759; Sample 2: 𝛸2(6, N=111)=5.14, p=.526). Follow-up
comparisons revealed no significant differences between any of the specific conditions in
both samples (all p’s>0.05). Generally speaking, participants tended to make approximately
the same number of “remember” or “know” judgments per evidence list, while slightly
fewer made “guess” judgments. Thus, list strength had no apparently effect on the R/K/G
judgments for “guilty.”
Discussion:
Recall that the goal of Study 1a was to determine which 7-word list would best
decrease the false alarm rate of the “guilty” list to a rate that could avoid a ceiling effect and
thus allow for more upward movement in our planned studies. Given that our primary
variable of interest is the Recognition Judgment, and neither Confidence Judgments nor
R/K/G Judgments revealed any notable trends, we drew our conclusions for this study
based primarily on the Recognition false alarm rates. Although we predicted that the
Medium or Weak list may be best suited, it seems the Strong list reliably produced a false
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alarm rate low enough to avoid a ceiling effect. Although the Medium-Strong also showed a
lower activation rate, we only included it as an extra measurement point when replicating
Sample 1. Thus, the Medium-Strong list may be useful in future research, but based on two
samples, the Strong list is the best candidate for testing the main research question of Study
1b: Can we use the 7-word list to measure differences in associations between guilty and
forms of evidence?
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CHAPTER 7: STUDY 1B
Design:
Between-subjects 5 group design (Evidence form: Control, Confession, DNA,
Fingerprint, Eyewitness). In a departure from our earlier work, we used fingerprint as a
form of evidence instead of bitemark. Participants in the Bitemark List condition did not
show different effects from the DNA list. Furthermore, fingerprints are similar to

confessions in a way DNA and eyewitnesses are not. As evidence, DNA or eyewitnesses can
be offered as incriminating or exonerating. However, confessions are only incriminating.
Similarly, fingerprint matches are offered primarily as incriminating evidence. Thus, a
Fingerprint List condition allows us to compare the association between guilt and evidence
that can indicate guilt or innocence to evidence that only indicates guilt.
Participants:
We collected data from 1423 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 407 for failing
to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 1016
participants (206 saw the Control list; 200 the Confession list; 204 the DNA list; 214 the
Eyewitness list; and 192 the Fingerprint list). Participants were primarily female (N=714;
male N=302), with an average age of 37.53 (SD=11.97). Given that our previous findings
had effect sizes that were small to insignificant, we assumed differences in evidence
inclusion would produce small-to-medium effect sizes. Thus, a priori power analyses
calculate that this sample size, approximately 200 per cell, will be sufficient to detect a
small-to-medium effect size (d=0.30) with 80% power.
English was the primary language of all but 16 participants; however these 16
participants provided free responses in the free recall sections and open-ended comments

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

32

sections without spelling errors and with good grammar. Further, excluding these
participants did not change the pattern of results. One hundred and twenty-eight of the
participants had earned a graduate degree; 430 earned a college degree; 545 earned a high
school diploma; and 4 had not finished high school.
We also asked participants whether they had served on a jury (Yes=181
participants), and whether a close friend or family member had ever been convicted of a
crime(Yes=227 participants). Excluding these participants did not change our results for
any of the analyses, and did not differ from participants who responded “no,” (with the
exception of Confidence for participants who had served on a jury; this subset is reported
below in the appropriate Results section) so we report data with all participants included.
Materials:
DRM Guilty List. Based on the results from Study 1a, we used the Strong Association
7-word “guilty” DRM list as our base Control list. Then, as in previous work, we removed
the 7th word from the list and inserted the experimentally-manipulated form of evidence
into fourth position on the list. Thus, we created five 7-word lists: a Control list, a Confession
list, a DNA list, an Eyewitness list, and a Fingerprint list (see Appendix C for the full lists).
DRM Chair List. For a control, we used the first seven words in the “chair” DRM list
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995).
For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.
Procedure:
Recruitment, list presentation, and memory measures were identical to Study 1a.
Participants first viewed a “chair” list, completed memory measures, and then viewed one
of five “guilty” lists, based on random assignment: Control, Confession, DNA, Eyewitness,
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Fingerprint. After viewing the “guilty” list and a five-minute delay task, participants
completed memory measures (free recall, recognition old/new judgments, confidence
judgments, and remember/know/guess judgments if they judged a word as “old”) for the
list, and were then debriefed.
Hypotheses:
H4: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the most false alarms, while the
Control list will generate the least false alarms. The Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists will
generate fewer than the Confession and DNA lists, but more than the Control.
H5: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the highest confidence for the critical
lure of the lists, followed by the Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists. The Control list will
generate the lowest confidence for the critical lure.
H6: The Confession and DNA lists will generate the most “remember” judgments and
fewest “guess” judgments for false alarms, while the Control list will generate the fewest
“remember” judgments and most “guess” judgments. The Eyewitness and Fingerprint lists
will generate intermediary “remember” and “guess” judgments.
Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.2)
Results:
Free Response. Notably, the false recall rates for each group were extraordinarily
low, ranging from MDNA=0.05, 95% CI=[0.02, 0.04] to MControl=0.09, 95% CI=[0.05, 0.12]. We
submitted these data to a five-way ANOVA, which was not statistically significant, F(4,
1011)=0.77, p=.544. All follow-up t-test comparisons were insignificant as well, p=[.088,
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.904]. Thus, our hypothesis was not supported: there were no significant differences in
activation of “guilty” based on the evidence in the list.
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Figure 2. Study 1b proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test

Recognition Judgments. In line with Study 1a results, false alarm rates to the critical
lure were much lower than our previous work (participants who read the Control list had a
mean false alarm rate of MControl=0.48 95% CI=[0.41, 0.55]). However, there was little
variation between the all of the lists (minimum: MDNA=0.46 95% CI=[0.39, 0.52]; maximum:
MConfession=0.53 95% CI=[0.46, 0.60]. Statistical tests supported the lack of difference
between groups, as the five-level ANOVA was not significant, (F(4, 1011)=0.68, p=.603) and
none of the between-group follow-up t-tests were significant (p=[.137, .983]). Despite not
achieving statistically significance, it is interesting that the Confession List yielded the
highest false alarm rate, while the DNA List yielded the lowest. Although our 7-word list
successfully decreased the average false alarm rate for the critical lure, the results do not
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support our hypothesis of the DNA and Confession Lists causing more false alarms than the
other lists.
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Figure 3. Study 1b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test

Confidence Judgments. Confidence ratings (1-5 Likert Scale; higher scores indicating
greater confidence in Old/New judgments) were submitted to a five-level ANOVA, and
similarly yielded no significant differences, F(4, 1011)=1.23, p=.296. Indeed, no follow-up ttests between groups were significant either: maximum MControl=3.83, 95% CI=[3.67, 3.99];
minimum MConfession=3.60, 95% CI=[3.43, 3.77]; p=[.052, .955]. Thus, these data provided no
support for our hypothesis that the DNA and Confession list would produce higher
confidence for “guilty” recognition judgments than the other lists.
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Figure 4. Study 1b confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty”

As mentioned previously, participants who had served on a jury (N=178; between
27 and 46 participants per group) showed significant differences in confidence ratings for
each list, F(4, 177)=2.71, p=.032, motivated primarily by significantly higher confidence for
the DNA List (M=4.11, 95% CI [3.88, 4.34]) than the Confession List (M=3.36, 95% CI [2.92,
3.81]; t(80)=3.23, p=.002, d=0.729 95% CI [0.506, 0.952]). However, because we find no
other significant effects for responses from this subgroup, and this specific effect
disappears from the overall sample, we refrain from interpreting this result.
Remember/Know/Guess Judgments. We submitted R/K/G judgments to a chi square
test of independence to investigate whether the evidence form on the list impacted the
phenomenological quality of false alarming to “guilty.” Recall that we only asked those who
selected “old” to make a R/K/G judgment. We found no support for our hypothesis, the chi
square was not significant χ2(8, N=505)=6.86, p=.552. Follow-up comparisons revealed no
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significant differences between any of the specific lists (all p’s>.05). Generally speaking,
participants tended to make approximately the same number of “remember” or “know”
judgments per evidence list, while slightly fewer made “guess” judgments (See Table 1).
Table 1
Study 1b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings
List Type
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Remember
35
34
38
32
35

Know
39
41
35
31
31

Guess
25
31
20
32
32

Total
99
106
93
98
98

Discussion:
Recall that the goal of the first study was twofold: first, Study 1a aimed to use a 7word list that reduced the rate of false recognition for the critical lure “guilty,” and Study 1b
tested for automatic associations between specific forms of evidence and guilt by placing
the evidence as one word in the shorter, weaker “guilty” list.
Study 1a was, overall, successful. Participants falsely remembered seeing “guilty” on
the 7-word list about 50% of the time, thus providing us with a usable 7-word list for Study
1b. However, this success comes with a surprising trend. We expected forward associative
strength to be positively correlated with the rate of false alarms to “guilty,” such that the
Strong and Medium-Strong lists generate the most false alarms and the Weak list to
generate the least. In fact, we found the opposite: Weak (Sample 1 MWeak=0.73; Sample 2
MWeak=0.70) and Medium (Sample 1 MMedium=0.68; Sample 2 MMedium=0.57) lists generated
the highest rates of “guilty” false alarms—in some cases, rates similar to the 14-word
Control lists in previous studies. The Strong list, on the other hand, generated a false alarm
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rate closer to the 50% we desired (Sample 1 MStrong=0.48; Sample 2 MStrong=0.50). This
negative correlation is surprising in light of previous research that forward associative
strength is positively correlated with critical lure false alarm rates (Gallo, 2010). Indeed,
we found this positive correlation with our control “chair” list. Thus, it seems that for our
list, a word’s forward associative strength to “guilty” may not be directly relatable to its
backward associative strength with “guilty” (which we have not measured). We believe this
is a feature of the “guilty” list deserving of future investigation. Indeed, a first step would be
to measure the BAS between the list words and “guilty” and compare those to our FAS
values from previous work. By doing this, we may verify that the backward associative
strength is, in fact, stronger for our Weak list, and hence explaining the surprising results of
Study 1a.
In Study 1B, we expected that a weaker, shorter 7-word list would make this
paradigm more sensitive than our previous work to associations between forensic
evidence and guilt in two ways. First, we expected that the lower false alarm rate would
avoid a potential ceiling effect by allowing more “room” for a strongly-associated word to
activate the critical lure at a higher rate. Second, we expected that fewer words would
allow each word to proportionately contribute more to activating the critical lure, thereby
magnifying the effect of changing a single word (the form of evidence).
Despite our weakened list, we did not find support for our hypotheses that lists
containing DNA and Confession would generate more false alarms to “guilty” than other lists
across all four of our dependent measures. One possible explanation for the lack of
significant differences is that even with a 7-word list, changing a single word on the list is
insufficient to alter the semantic activation strength for “guilty.” Indeed, as the results of

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

39

Study 1a show, cutting the list in half only reduced false alarm rates by approximately 5%25%, compared to previous work with the 14-word list. Thus, while the 7-word list may
avoid a ceiling effect in false alarm rate, it may not prevent a ceiling effect for the
proportional contribution of each word in activating the semantic network. Successful
development of this paradigm may require a list made of words with very weak forward
associative strength with “guilty”—metrics that we do not presently have and, given the
seemingly negative relationship between FAS and false alarm rates (Study 1a), we cannot
estimate.
In summary, using the 7-word list did not yield different results from a 14-word list.
Although the false recognition rates were in line with what we suspected would make for a
more sensitive paradigm, we failed to find any significant differences between the different
evidence lists. Thus, while these results are interesting from a DRM-design standpoint, a
traditional DRM list appears ineffective for measuring automatic associations between
evidence and guilt. Fortunately, we have other ecologically-valid methods of influencing the
semantic activation of the critical lure—namely, by manipulating the context in which the
list words are given. Our next step was to test for automatic associations with a more
context-rich paradigm.

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

40

CHAPTER 8: STUDY 2 – THE DRM STORY FORMAT
Given the contrived nature of a list of words used in the previous experiment, our
next goal was to increase the ecological validity of our guilty associations paradigm to a
method more in line with how people normally encounter information. One way to
accomplish this goal is to present the DRM words in a story structure, allowing us to test
whether some forms of evidence show greater association with guilt than others in a more
context-rich paradigm. By presenting a DRM Story instead of a DRM list, we hypothesized
the context provided by the Story format would increase the association between the list
words and the critical lure (Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007). More specifically, instead
of having the “guilty” list words presented one a time, here we instructed participants to
read a paragraph containing these words. For example, participants read: “A jury is a group
of citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime has been
committed. The judge provides order...”
The story format provides context that, by explaining how a trial works, makes the
connection between the words easier to detect. We expected that adding this context
would produce a deeper semantic processing of the words, a process that, compared to
shallow processing, produces more false alarms to the critical lure (Toglia, Neuschatz, &
Goodwin, 1999; Thapar & McDermott, 2001). It is likely that when people read about
information for a criminal investigation, they automatically consider the evidence present
to determine guilt. That participants may evaluate the story (focusing on evaluating
evidence) is, to our knowledge, unique to our DRM list and should result in a deeper
semantic connection to “guilty.” In turn, the more strongly a piece of evidence indicates
guilt, the stronger the activation of the concept of guilt. As a result, we expected that
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participants in the Confession Story and DNA Story conditions would false alarm to the
critical lure more than participants in the other groups, enhanced by the context and
deeper semantic processing of the evidence in the Story.
The research on false memories for implied content is particularly relevant here.
Chan and McDermott (2006) found that people can form false memories for seeing implied,
but not presented, information. To elaborate, they asked participants to read sentences
that pragmatically implied, but did not explicitly state, some idea. Later, the researchers
tested the participants’ memory for the sentences they read, and sentences the participants
did not read but contained the implied message. For example, participants would read “The
new baby stayed awake all night” but then see at test “The new baby cried all night” and
rate their memory for the sentence with a “remember”, “know”, or “guess” judgment. Chan
and McDermott found that participants generally responded to the implied messages with
“remember” and “know” at rates very similar to presented information. The paradigm Chan
and McDermott used is analogous to what we designed here. It stands to reason that many
participants could read a DRM story about “guilty” and derive the implication the
paragraph describes a guilty person. Although our memory test is focused specifically on
single words, rather than whole sentences and the message they communicate, we may still
be able to elicit false alarms to “guilty” with a DRM story. In fact, given Chan and
McDermott’s findings that implied information was recalled with the same
phenomenological strength as studied information, the added context may strengthen the
memory quality for “guilty” in addition to increasing the frequency of false alarms.
Alternatively, it is possible that a DRM Story would actually decrease false alarm
rates to the critical lure. Previous research has found that ease of theme identifiability is an

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

42

important predictor for false recall of the critical lure: When a theme is highly identifiable,
(as in a DRM Story, the very reason it was developed to be used with child participants),
adults show a decreased false alarm rate for the critical lure (Carneiro, Fernandez, & Dias,
2009). Carneiro et al. (2012) argued that this seemingly counter-intuitive finding is due to
adults’ use of an “identify-to-reject” strategy: if a participant is able to identify the theme of
a list (the critical lure) and notice that specific word is missing, they will not show the DRM
effect. Therefore, if our DRM Story makes the theme of “guilty” highly identifiable, it could
lead to a decrease in false alarms. Furthermore, if this increase in theme identifiability
occurs, we could have an effect opposite of what we predict for our evidence forms: by
removing an associated word and including a weakly-associated type of evidence, “guilty”
could be less identifiable, thereby increasing false alarms for the critical lure.
As with Study 1, Study 2 was conducted in two parts: In 2a, we developed a “guilty”
DRM Story format that we could use for 2b. In 2b, we used that “guilty” DRM Story to test
automatic associations between evidence and guilt in a manner similar to Study 1b. As
such, we can make the same predictions regarding false alarms to “guilty” here as in Study
1. We expect participants reading a “guilty” story that contains DNA and confession to false
alarm to the critical lure more often than participants who view a story containing more
weakly-associated forms of evidence or those viewing the Control story.
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CHAPTER 9: STUDY 2A
Design:
There were no experimental manipulations in this study. In two samples, all
participants read the same “guilty” DRM story. Each sample viewed a slightly different
version of the “guilty” DRM story (Sample 1: 14-word; Sample 2: 7-word)
Participants:
Sample 1. We collected data from 75 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 6 for
failing to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 69
participants. There were 27 females, 25 males, and they had an average age of 37.99
(SD=12.02). English was the primary language of all participants. Eleven held graduate
degrees, 30 college degrees, and 27 high school diplomas, and 1 did not complete high
school.2
Sample 2. We collected 31 data from MTurk workers. Of these, 7 were excluded,

leaving 24 in our final analysis. There were 14 females, 10 males, and they had an average
age of 38.79 (SD=10.63). English was the primary language of all but one participant. Two
held graduate degrees, 11 college degrees, and 8 high school diplomas, and 2 did not finish
high school.
Materials:
We adapted our “guilty” DRM list to construct two “guilty” DRM Stories: a 14-word
and 7-word version. Both Stories generally describe the legal process. The goal was to
create a list that produces 30% recognition false alarms to the critical lure. We proposed
This is the same sample as Study 3a Sample 1. After reading the Story Format and taking
the memory test, these participants then read the evidence primes in Study 3a.
2
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30% as a cut off because it conforms to previously-developed DRM lists (“king”, 27%;
Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995), but we expected to have a lower false alarm rate
than the list-format in Study 1 because our adults may use a “search-to-reject” strategy,
minimizing the DRM effect.
The 14-word version contained the fourteen “guilty” list words from previous work,
and was 133 words overall (emphasis added). The 14 words appeared in the same order as
the list, that is, ordered from strongest to weakest forward associative strength.
14-word Story (Sample 1) A jury is a group of normal citizens that reviews
information in a case to determine whether a crime has been committed. The judge
provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family members and
interested community members can be present in the court as well. If a person
loses, they will be considered a criminal. If they win, they are usually innocent and
show this by the end of the trial. If they lose, they are sent to jail, especially for
murder. They are also labeled as a convict, which sometimes makes them feel
shame. Of course, a person is not alone – they usually have a lawyer on their side to
argue before the verdict, as well as help them get a fair sentence. Thus, many people
are involved in the system.
The 7-word version contained the same seven words used in Study 1b, and was 72
words overall. We tested a 7-word paragraph for the same reason we developed a 7-word
list: a 7-word paragraph has a better chance of avoiding a false alarm ceiling rate, and the
substitution of one word should have a larger impact on semantic activation.
7-word Story (Sample 2) A jury is a group of normal citizens that reviews
information in a case to determine whether a crime has been committed. The judge
provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family members and
interested community members can be present in the court as well. If a person
loses, they will be considered a criminal. If they win, they are usually innocent and
show this by the end of the trial.
For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.
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Procedure:
We directed our mTurk participants to Qualtrics.com where they viewed the “guilty”
DRM Story. After a five minute delay, participants completed a Free Recall measure, where
we asked them to replicate the story paragraph they read as closely as possible. Afterward,
they completed the same Recognition test (Old/New judgments), Confidence measure, and
Remember/Know/Guess judgments for words they determined were Old, as in Study 1a
and 1b.
Results:
The goal of this study was to find a DRM Story paragraph that activated the critical
lure enough to be useful for our experiments— a minimum of 30% to keep it similar to the
weakest widely-used DRM list (“king”; Stadler, Roediger, & McDermott, 1995). To make
this determination we relied primarily on the Recognition judgments, with Free Recall
rates as a secondary measure. Given that the 7-word list we employed in Study 1b did not
provide useful data for Free Recall, likely because of a floor effect, we were interested in
whether the Story format would produce a different trend. As such, we did not analyze or
interpret Confidence or R/K/G judgments in this study.
Free Recall Between the two samples, participants demonstrated an unexpectedly
high rate of reporting “guilty” on the Free Recall memory test. In Sample 1, M14-Word=0.710
of participants false alarmed to guilty. In Sample 2, M7-Word=0.708 of participants false
alarmed. Independent sample t-tests revealed these two rates were not significantly
different from one another (t(91)=0.02, p=.987).
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Recognition Judgments Similar to the Free Recall measure, participants false alarmed
to “guilty” at a much higher rate than was expected. In Sample 1, M14-Word=0.826 false
alarmed, while in Sample 2, M7-word=0.917 false alarmed. Although these rates varied
slightly, t-test comparisons revealed they were not significantly different from one another
(t(91)=1.06, p=.290).
Discussion:
Overall, the “guilty” DRM Story format was far more successful than we expected.
While we expected false recognition rates around 30%, participants actually false alarmed
two- to three-times as often. Further, while we made no specific predictions about Free
Recall false alarms, we did not expect such high rates as we found here. Recall the purpose
of Study 2a was to develop a usable Story format for “guilty” for use in Study 2b. The best
story, then, would be one that would maximize the chances of measuring changes in
semantic activation: Based on these results, we concluded the 7-word Story was best
suited. We reasoned that in a 7-word story, a single word would contribute proportionally
more to the semantic activation than would a single word in the 14-word story. Further,
because the 7-word and 14-word stories were not significantly different in Free Recall and
Recognition false alarms, the 7-word story does not have any memory test disadvantages.
Thus, we can test our main research question with a context-rich “guilty” DRM story: Can
we detect differences in automatic association between specific forms of evidence and
guilt?
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CHAPTER 10: STUDY 2B
Design:
Between-subjects 5-group design (DRM Story Evidence form: Control, confession,
DNA, fingerprint, eyewitness).
Participants:
We recruited 1188 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 179 for failing to follow

directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 1009 participants (204
saw the Control list; 202 the Confession list; 201 the DNA list; 200 the Eyewitness list; and
202 the Fingerprint list). Participants were primarily female (N=713; male N=296), with an
average age of 38.05 (SD=12.43). Given that our previous findings had effect sizes that
were small to insignificant, we assumed any observed differences as a result of our
experimental manipulation would produce small-to-medium effect sizes. Thus, a-prior
power analyses calculate that this sample size, approximately 200 per cell, would be
sufficient to detect a small-to-medium effect size (d=0.30) with 80% power.
English was the primary language of all but 15 participants; however these 15
participants provided free responses in the free recall sections and open-ended comments
sections without spelling errors and with good grammar. Further, excluding these
participants did not change the pattern of results. One hundred and thirty-one of the
participants held graduate degrees; 429 college degrees; 442 high school diplomas; and 7
had not finished high school.
As in Study 1b, we performed each of our analyses for participants who had served
on a jury (N=168) and participants who have had a close family member or friend
convicted of a serious crime (N=247). For the results of the Recognition Test, Confidence,
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and R/K/G judgments, results do not differ between subsets of participants, nor from the
results of the combined sample. There were, however, differences for the Free Recall
responses between subsets, which we report below.
Materials:
DRM “Guilty” Story. Based on the results of Study 2a, we developed a 7-word DRM
Story with the critical lure “guilty.” This version served as our Control Story. We also
created four other versions, each containing a different form of evidence (confession, DNA,
eyewitness, or fingerprint). These lists were created in the same manner as Study 1b: We
removed the last word (“trial”) and placed the evidence word in a novel sentence in the
middle of the story paragraph (see Appendix F).
DRM “Sleep” Story. As a control list, we had participants read the DRM “sleep” story
(Dewhurst, et al. 2007). Because we wanted to keep it approximately the same length as
our “guilty” story (72 words), we used the full “sleep” story that contains fourteen sleeprelated words (80 words total) rather than a story containing only the first seven words
(38 words total).
For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.
Procedure:
The procedure was identical to Study 1b with one exception: the Free Recall portion
asked participants to replicate the entire paragraph they read, rather than list words.
Hypotheses:
H7: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the most false alarms (both free
recall and recognition), while the Control stories will generate the fewest false alarms. The
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Eyewitness and Fingerprint stories will generate fewer than the Confession and DNA
stories, but more than the Control.
H8: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the highest confidence for the
critical lure of the stories, followed by the Eyewitness and Fingerprint stories. The Control
story will generate the lowest confidence for the critical lure.
H9: The Confession and DNA stories will generate the most “remember” judgments
and fewest “guess” judgments for false alarms, while the Control stories will generate the
fewest “remember” judgments and most “guess” judgments. The Eyewitness and
Fingerprint stories will generate intermediary “remember” and “guess” judgments.
Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.20)
Results:
Free Response. On average, Free Recall rates were lower than Study 2a (minimum:
MEyewitness=0.50, 95% CI=[.43, .57]; maximum: MDNA=0.66, 95% CI=[.59, .72]), but much
higher than any of our previous work using the list format. We submitted the data to a fivelevel ANOVA, which yielded a significant effect of list type, F(4, 1004)=3.12, p=.015,
𝜂p2=0.012. This main effect is driven primarily by significant differences between the DNA
Story group (MDNA=0.66, 95% CI=[.59, .72]) and the Control Story group (MControl=0.51, 95%
CI=[.45, .58], t(403)=2.92, p=.004, d=0.313 95% CI[0.254, 0.372]) and the Eyewitness Story
group (MEyewitness=0.50, 95% CI=[.43, .57], t(399)=3.21, p=.001, d=0.328, 95% CI=[0.281.
0.376]. All other follow-up comparisons were not significant, p=[.72, .768] (Appendix H)
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Figure 5. Study 2b proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test

It is worth noting that the main effect for List Type did not reach statistical
significance for the participants who had served on a jury (N=168; F(4, 163)=1.31, p=.267),
nor for the participants with a close friend or family member convicted of a felony (N=247;
F(4, 242)=1.47, p=.213). For both of these groups, however, the results showed the same
general trend, with participants who viewed the DNA story showing high rates of false
recall (jury subgroup, M=0.60, 95% CI [.43, .77]; felony subgroup, M=0.60, 95% CI [.47,
.74]) compared to all other list types except for the Fingerprint List (jury subgroup, M=0.64,
95% CI [.46, .81]; felony subgroup, M=0.63, 95% CI [.49, .78]). Because the trends were
very similar, and the subsets represent a fraction of the sample size we predicted we would
need, we do not think these differences between subsets are meaningful.
To summarize, here our hypotheses were partially supported: Participants who
read the DNA Story did, in fact, show significantly more false alarms than two of the other
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groups. However, participants in the Confession group did not false alarm more than other
groups.
Recognition Judgments. There was very little variability in false alarming to “guilty”
on the Recognition test between groups: minimum, MControl=0.84, 95% CI=[.79, .89]:
maximum: MDNA=0.89, 95% CI=[.84, .93] and MEyewitness=0.89, 95% CI=[.84, .93]. We
submitted recognition judgments to a five-level ANOVA, which yielded no main effect, F(4,
1004)=0.65, p=.630. Unsurprisingly, follow-up t-test comparisons yielded no significant
differences between any of the groups, p=[.214, .986]. Thus, the data provided no evidence
for our hypotheses: neither the DNA nor Confession Stories caused more false alarms on the
Recognition Test than other evidence Stories. While the Control Story did cause the fewest
false alarms, it was not significantly lower than any other groups.
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Figure 6. Study 2b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test
Confidence Judgments. The Story Format produced higher Confidence judgments for
“guilty” than we found using the List format in Study 1b (minimum: MControl=4.27, 95%
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CI=[4.13, 4.41]: maximum: MFingerprint=4.47, 95% CI=[4.35, 4.59]). We submitted the data to
a five-level ANOVA, which did not yield a significant main effect, F(4, 1004)=1.36, p=.246.
There was, however, one significant difference in the follow-up t-tests: Participants in the
Fingerprint Story group were more confident in their decisions about the critical lure than
were participants in the Control Story group, t(404)=2.09, p=.037, d=0.208, 95% CI=[0.114,
0.301]. No other comparisons between groups were statistically significant, p=[.073, .806].
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Figure 7. Study 2b Confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty”
Despite the significant difference between participants who read the Fingerprint
Story and participants who read the Control Story, we did not find support for our
hypotheses. Although the Control story did generate the lowest confidence ratings, it was
only significantly lower than participants who saw the Fingerprint list. Similarly,
participants who read the DNA and Confession stories were not the most confident about
their decision for “guilty,” which is what we predicted.
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R/K/G Judgments. As in Study 1b, we tested whether different forms of evidence on
the “guilty” list led to phenomenologically different false alarms to the critical lure. We did
not find any differences between groups, providing no support for our hypothesis: χ2(8,
N=873)=487, p=.771. Follow-up comparisons did not reveal any significant differences
between specific list conditions (all p’s>.05).
Interestingly, the overall trend of R/K/G responses for all lists did differ from Study
1b. Recall that in Study 1b, participants (regardless of the list they saw) responded
approximately equally with “remember” and “know” responses, with slightly fewer “guess”
responses. Here, however, the vast majority of participants responded with “remember”
responses, followed by “know” responses, and then very few “Guess” responses (See Table
2)
Table 2.
Study 2b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings
List Type
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Remember
121
126
121
115
119

Know
42
37
44
53
43

Guess
9
9
13
9
12

Total
172
172
178
177
174

Discussion:
As with Study 1, Study 2 was partially successful. On the one hand, we successfully
developed a “guilty” DRM Story. The majority of participants falsely recalled reading
“guilty” in a paragraph about the criminal justice system—both on the Free Recall and
Recognition memory tests—with high confidence. On the other hand, the different evidence
lists did not result in differences for any of our memory measures.
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Despite no significant findings between the different lists, we are largely encouraged
by the success of the story structure. It appears that the added context is quite effective in
activating participants’ network of “guilty” in such a way that, perhaps, leaves it resistant to
a “search to reject” strategy that typically produces a decreased DRM effect in adults.
Although the Recognition Test responses were higher than we expected, we are
particularly interested in the Free Recall rates. It seems that “guilty” is a key component to
participants’ understanding of a story about the legal system. Put another way, participants
cannot help but activate “guilty” when the story format provides context of a person in the
legal system—something we find troubling, if not unsurprising (see the Conclusion section
below for a more in depth discussion of this possibility). Further, the trend of R/K/G
suggests that not only are participants activating “guilty” more easily, but so too are they
activating it more strongly. Nearly 69% of participants responded “remember” for the
critical lure—a strikingly high rate for a false memory. Thus, the added context of a
criminal trial that the story format provides, seems to activate “guilty” more easily and in a
more detailed, phenomenologically-real way.
That participants reported such a high rate of clear, phenomenologically-strong
false memories also suggests a reason that we found no differences between groups: a
ceiling effect. Given the notably high rates of false free recall and false recognition, it may
be that strongly-associated forms of evidence cannot drive false alarms rates any higher.
Indeed, this was our rationale for the use of potentially-weaker 7-word lists in Study 1. One
solution to such a ceiling effect may be to design a story format that has a weaker
association to “guilty.” Because less work has been done with the DRM story format than
the DRM list—particularly with adult populations—the exact method of how to accomplish
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this would require further testing. One option may be to utilize a story that is not so clearly
about a trial; perhaps a vignette that describes both criminal and non-criminal activities.
Another possibility may be using the key words in a more ambiguous context. Of course,
this is easier for some words than others: “judge,” “trial,” and “court” are words we use in
non-criminal contexts all the time, whereas words like “lawyer” and “crime” are fairly
specific to the judicial system.
Overall, we found the story format to be a very successful paradigm for eliciting
false alarms to “guilty”—but less successful for our purpose of measuring associations
between “guilty” and evidence. The high rates of false alarms on the Free Recall, and the
clear trend in R/K/G responses, suggest this format offers a study of guilt associations that
the traditional DRM list does not. Although we did not find evidence to support our
hypotheses regarding the strength of association between guilt and different forms of
evidence, we think the “guilty” story can be a valuable research tool for more general
investigations of how people think of, and remember, guilt.
Clearly, the additional context afforded by a story format increases semantic
activation of “guilt” compared to the simpler list format. Yet, this increase in context did not
make differential associations between evidence and guilt easier to detect. One potential
reason for the lack of differences may be that our participants did not consider any of the
evidence forms to be different in the context in the trial—all evidence indicated “guilt,”
regardless of the degree. Our next step, then, was to influence context in a different way by
exerting more control over how people viewed the different forms of evidence. Rather than
exploit the overall context of “guilty,” we can instead influence the association between
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evidence and guilt more specifically—that is, by providing contextual information that
influences how people think about the form of evidence via priming.

56

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

57

CHAPTER 11: STUDY 3 – PRIMING EVIDENCE QUALITY
In the real world, high-quality evidence should lead to more convictions than lowquality evidence. Jury decision-making research has, to some extent, supported this
premise. Several studies have found that when expert testimony is present, or fully
explained, participants show increased sensitivity to the strengths and weaknesses of such
evidence (e.g., Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1989; Kovera, Gresham, Borgida, Gray, & Regan,
1997) Further, in a meta-analytic review of 206 studies using deliberating jurors, Devine,
Clayton, Dunford, Seying and Price (2000) found strength of evidence was one of the
strongest predictors of a guilty verdict: The stronger the evidence, the more likely the jury
concluded the defendant was guilty. However, it is worth noting that several studies (e.g.,
Levett & Kovera, 2008; McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010) have found that jurors are sometimes
unable to differentiate between good and bad evidence.
Taken together, these results suggest that any method that would cause someone to
view a specific type of evidence as higher quality would cause a corresponding increase in
the association between that evidence and guilt. Conversely, any manipulation that leads
someone to see a particular form of evidence as being of poorer quality should equally
decrease the association between that evidence and guilt. Thus, if we can influence how
people view the quality of a specific form of evidence, such strengthening or weakening of
the association between that evidence and guilt could be measurable with our DRM
paradigm in the form of more (or less) false recall. Priming is one such method that may
cause such a shift in association strength, because it has been used successfully to influence
how people false alarm on a DRM task (Lenton et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007). In our
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study, the primes will be information regarding the scientific validity of each form of
evidence.
Scientists have established standards for forensic evidence: some versions are of
high validity, such as DNA; others are characterized as unscientific, such as bitemark
evidence (National Academy of Sciences, 2009; 2014). However, previous research has
demonstrated contextual information about forensic evidence can alter how people regard
that evidence. Lawson (2014) found that participants who read illustrative stories about
legal cases that included facts about evidence altered their views about the validity of
evidence. Lawson was primarily motivated in how pretrial publicity about evidence quality
can influence a case. Whereas pretrial publicity studies have normally focused on guilt
judgments and more direct judgments of the defendant (e.g., Ruva & McEvoy, 2008),
pretrial information can also affect the case indirectly by influencing opinions of evidence.
Here, we seek to accomplish something similar by directly influencing how our participants
view evidence in an attempt to alter that evidence’s connection to guilt.
It is likely, however, that some forms of evidence are more resistant to priming than
others. Forms of evidence that are more closely associated with guilty, such as confession
and DNA, would likely require extremely strong manipulations to influence that
association. For example, as reviewed in Chapter 1, both real cases and laboratory research
have demonstrated a confession very likely leads to a guilty verdict (Kassin & Sukel, 1997)
and is more likely to lead to a guilty verdict than other forms of evidence (Kassin and
Neumann, 1997). Weaker-associated evidence-types, such as eyewitness and fingerprints,
that sometimes (but do not always) lead to a guilty verdict, may be more susceptible to
such priming, because a person’s belief in the reliability of these forms of evidence may be
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easier to shift. Therefore, in Study 3 we ask, can priming participants with evidence quality
affect the evidence’s association with guilt in a DRM paradigm?
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CHAPTER 12: STUDY 3A
Design:
Because the goal of this Study was to generate effective negative- and positive-

evidence primes, there was no experimental manipulation. Instead, participants saw either
two positive- and two negative-evidence lists (Sample 1) or one of the eight possible
primes (Samples 2 & 3). We varied the number of primes participants saw after Sample 1
due to concerns over anchoring-and-adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) for
particularly strong and weak forms of evidence (see Results for the full rationale).
Participants:
In Sample 1, we collected data from 75 MTurk workers. Of these, we excluded 6 for
failing to follow directions and/or technical issues. Thus, our final sample included 69
participants (35 saw the DNA-, Confession+, Fingerprint+, and Eyewitness- primes; 34 saw
the DNA+, Confession-, Fingerprint-, and Eyewitness- primes). Participants were 27 female,
25 male, with an average age of 37.99 (SD=12.02). English was the primary language of all
participants. 11 held graduate degrees, 30 college degrees, and 27 high school diplomas,
and 1 did not complete high school.3
In Sample 2, we collected data from 81 participants and excluded 14. Our final
sample included 67 participants (approximately 8 participants saw each of the eight
primes; see Table 4 for exact N per cell), 39 of which were female and 28 male, with an
average age of 38.40 (SD=11.73). English was the primary language of all participants; 8

This is the same sample as Study 2a Sample 1. After reading the Story Format and taking
the memory test, these participants then read the evidence primes for this study.
3
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held graduate degrees, 27 college degrees, 29 high school diplomas, and 3 did not complete
high school.
Sample 3 was composed of 163 participants, 8 of whom we excluded, leaving 155
participants for analyses (approximately 19 participants per prime; see Table 5 for exact N
per cell). 106 of these participants were female and 49 were male; on average, they were
37.72 years old (SD=11.71). English was the primary language of all participants. 20
participants held graduate degrees; 64 held college degrees; 68 had a high school diploma;
and 3 did not finish high school.
Materials:
Evidence Ratings. Measures In order to assess the efficacy of the primes (that is, to
determine whether a negative prime decreased participants’ trust in that specific evidence,
and a positive prime increased participants’ trust), we asked participants to rate each form
of evidence in three ways: 1) how reliable (how often it is correct or wrong; 10=never
wrong, 0=always wrong); 2) how convincing (how useful it would be for the participant in
making a guilt determination if they were on a jury; 10=completely convincing, 0=not
convincing at all) they believed it was. Participants completed this rating twice: once before
reading the prime, and then again after reading the prime; 3) immediately after reading the
prime, participants responded to the question: “How did the paragraph you just read affect
your opinion of [the form of evidence]?” on a scale of -2 to +2 (-2=I trust it a lot less; -1=I
trust it a little less; 0=no change, I trust it the same; 1=I trust it a little more; 2=I trust it a
lot more).
Evidence Primes. We developed eight short vignettes that framed the four pieces of
evidence we use in our DRM lists and stories (positive and negative versions for confession,
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DNA, eyewitness, and fingerprint). The positive vignettes explained how the key piece of
evidence led to a perpetrator of a murder being correctly convicted, while the negative
vignettes explained how the key piece of evidence led to an innocent person being
wrongfully convicted of the murder. The vignettes for each evidence form differed in some
aspects, such as the location of the murder, names of the perpetrator, and how the police
conducted the preliminary investigation. Across the three samples, we slightly varied the
content of the vignettes to achieve the desired shifts in reliability, credibility, and opinions
in the evidence. For example (changes underlined):
Sample 1
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods,
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. Therefore, Watkins’ confession
was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.

Sample 2
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods,
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. In fact, confessions help to catch
many perpetrators. Therefore, Watkins’ confession was key in making sure the right person
was brought to justice.
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Sample 3
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after
a two-day trial. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee
man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his
house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation
revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The
jury found Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many
accurate details, and the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods,
making it very reliable and likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a
person will rarely confess to a crime they did not commit. In fact, confessions help to catch
many perpetrators. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is reliable
and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence
should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Watkin's
confession was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.

For a full list of the vignettes, see Appendix I.
Procedure:
Sample 1 participants rated all four forms of evidence on their reliability and
convincingness. Then, they read four of the eight possible primes (two positive and two
negative, one for each form of evidence, randomized order) and rated how their opinion of
the evidence changed immediately after each prime. After reading the four primes,
participants again rated the reliability and convincingness of all four forms of evidence a
second time before being debriefed.
Sample 2 and 3 participants rated only one form of evidence determined by random
assignment. After rating the evidence’s reliability and convincingness, participants read one
prime, rated how it affected their opinion of the evidence, and then again rated the
evidence’s reliability and convincingness before being debriefed.
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Results:
To determine whether our primes were successful, we focused on three
measurements: the change in reliability ratings between pre- and post-prime ratings, the
change in convincingness ratings between pre- and post-prime ratings, and the post-prime
ratings of how the primes changed participants’ opinion of the evidence.
Sample 1. Our first version of the evidence primes was not successful, but showed
promise. On some measures, for some of the evidence forms, participants demonstrated
significant differences between the positive and negative primes (e.g., change in opinion of
DNA, confession reliability and convincingness); however in some cases, the differences
were not significantly different between positive and negative primes (eyewitness
reliability and credibility) or the differences were negatively skewed. For example, despite
significant differences between groups, participants rated DNA reliability, DNA
convincingness, fingerprint reliability, and fingerprint convincingness more negatively after
viewing the positive prime (Table 3).
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Table 3
Study 3a Sample 1 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings
Priming
Trust in
Quality (N)
Evidence
∆Reliability
∆Convincingness
Positive (34)
0.23 (0.73)
0.20 (1.57)
0.06 (1.43
Negative (35)
-0.62 (0.88)
-0.88 (1.59)
-0.79 (1.61)
DNA
Positive (34)
0.12 (0.92)
-0.44 (1.16)
-0.21(1.10)
Negative (35)
-0.51 (0.84)
-1.63 (2.66)
-1.37 (2.30)
Eyewitness
Positive (35)
0.15 (0.82)
0.32 (1.41)
0.15 (1.74)
Negative (34)
-0.66 (0.87)
-0.26 (1.36)
-0.71 (1.98)
Fingerprint
Positive (35)
0.37 (0.73)
-2.00 (2.44)
-0.51 (1.42)
Negative (34)
-0.79 (0.77)
-3.26 (2.70)
-1.50 (1.54)
Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative
groups.
Evidence Type
Confession

Our method, however, presented a potential confound for these variables. Because
participants viewed four primes and rating all four forms of evidence, we suspected that it
was possible the primes were interacting in such a way as to decrease perceived credibility
of all forms of evidence, not just those in the negative primes. For example, participants
may have read the negative DNA prime and thought if DNA can be flawed, all evidence can
be flawed. Therefore, we decided to collect another sample with two alterations. First, we
tweaked the wording of our primes (see Appendix I). Second, we only showed participants
one prime and had them rate only the relevant form of evidence; thus, they were not (with
or without awareness) comparing one form of evidence to another.
Sample 2. Overall, the adjustments to the procedure (only one prime) and tweaks to
the wording of the primes moved us closer to effective primes. As seen below (Table 4), all
primes resulted in rating changes in the correct direction. Unfortunately, many of the
ratings were not significantly different between participants in the positive prime and
participants in the negative prime groups. Additionally, some of the primes yielded no
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change in ratings (e.g., positive prime confession reliability, and positive prime DNA

reliability). One possible reason for such small, sometimes non-existent, differences for the
credibility and convincingness scores was that the pre-prime rating of these aspects was
anchoring the post-prime ratings. As such, we only measured post-prime ratings in Sample
3, and again tweaked the wording of our primes in the hope of strengthening the effect.
Table 4
Study 3a Sample 2 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings
Evidence Type
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Priming
Quality (N)
Positive (7)
Negative (9)
Positive (9)
Negative (7)
Positive (7)
Negative (8)
Positive (8)
Negative (8)

Trust in
Evidence
0.57 (0.54)
-0.78 (-0.78)
0.00 (0.50)
-1.00 (0.58)
-0.13 (0.99)
-0.73 (1.01)
0.38 (0.92)
-0.75 (0.71)

∆Reliability
0.00 (1.41)
-1.11 (1.27)
0.00 (0.00)
-3.29 (2.36)
0.13 (1.55)
-1.45 (2.84)
0.00 (0.93)
-1.25 (1.75)

∆Convincingness
-0.14 (1.35)
-0.78 (0.97)
-0.11 (0.78)
-3.00 (2.24)
0.25 (0.46)
-2.18 (3.16)
0.25 (1.67)
-1.38 (2.26)

Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative
groups.

Sample 3. As seen below (Table 5), the third iteration of our priming paragraphs
were successful in creating differences between the positive- and negative-prime for each
form of evidence. Because we no longer measured pre- and post-prime ratings, the goal for
credibility and convincingness ratings was that the positive-prime participants rated the
evidence higher than the negative-prime participants: indeed, for every form of evidence
we found this trend. Further, negative-prime participants remarked that they trusted the
evidence less, whereas positive-prime participants expressed trusting the evidence more.
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Table 5
Study 3a Sample 3 Priming Pilot Evidence Ratings
Evidence Type
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Priming Type
(N)
Positive (21)
Negative (14)
Positive (18)
Negative (21)
Positive (18)
Negative (21)
Positive (20)
Negative (22)

Trust in
Evidence
0.38 (0.87)
-0.93 (0.83)
0.22 (0.94)
-0.76 (0.89)
-0.22 (0.65)
-1.14 (0.79)
0.35 (1.04)
-1.05 (0.76)

Reliability
7.24 (1.81)
4.00 (2.11)
7.94 (1.63)
6.81 (1.83)
6.61 (2.17)
3.00 (2.74)
8.15 (1.69)
4.86 (2.36)

Convincingness
7.29 (2.31)
5.79 (2.87)
7.72 (1.67)
6.62 (1.75)
6.50 (2.33)
3.10 (2.51)
7.30 (2.08)
4.45 (2.18)

Note. Bolded values are significantly different (p<.05) between the Positive and Negative
groups.
Discussion:
It is worth mentioning that in a few cases, the primes were not successful according
to strict statistical convention. For instance, the positive- and negative-primes did not
result in significant differences for confession convincingness (p=.096), and DNA
convincingness (p=.052). This finding is not completely surprising: Given that DNA and
confessions are seen as strong indicators of guilt, it logically follows that a single vignette
may do little to shift participants’ opinion of the evidence’s credibility as a whole. Similarly,
the eyewitness positive prime produced slightly negative change for participants’ opinion
of the evidence after reading the vignette—even though it was significantly higher than
positive participants’ ratings. But again, this result does not necessarily invalidate the
usefulness of the prime: it is a very small negative rating (M=-0.22 on a 2 to -2 scale).
Further, because eyewitnesses lead to so many wrongful convictions, our participants may
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be inherently skeptical of any court case in which an eyewitness is the only piece of
evidence, making it unlikely they will form more positive views of eyewitness evidence.
These minor problems aside, we believed that Sample 3 provided sufficient
evidence to warrant use of these primes in Study 3b, in which we measured how priming
evidence quality information influences responses to our evidence “guilty” DRM lists.
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CHAPTER 13: STUDY 3B
Design:

Between-subjects 3(Prime Type: positive, negative, neutral) x 4(Evidence DRM list:
confession, DNA, fingerprint, eyewitness) + 1 (no-prime control list).
Participants:
We recruited 804 participants for Study 3b. Of these, 150 were excluded for failure
to follow directions and/or technical issues, leaving 654 participants for analyses
(approximately 50 participants per cell). An a-prior power analysis calculated this sample
size was sufficient to detect a small main effect (f=0.15) with 80% power. Participants had
an average age of 38.07 years (SD=13.09); 426 were female and 228 were male. 94 held a
graduate degree, 285 a college degree, 274 a high school diploma, and 1 did not complete
high school. English was the primary language of all but 5 participants; however, these 5
participants responded to the free recall and free response sections of the study with good
grammar and without any errors.
Of our final 654 participants, 127 reported having served on a jury, and 146
reported having a close friend or family member convicted of a felony. Separate analyses
were performed for these subgroups, and they did not vary from each other, their
counterpart subgroups, or the overall sample for any of our analyses. Thus, we report the
combined data.
Materials:
Positive and Negative Evidence Primes. Participants (except Control group) read one
of eight possible primes (positive or negative for confession, DNA, eyewitness, or
fingerprint) developed in Study 3a (See Appendix I).
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Filler Vignettes. In order to disguise the link between the prime and subsequent
DRM list, the experimentally-relevant evidence prime was embedded between two
unrelated, but stylistically similar, filler primes (See Appendix I).
“Guilty” DRM List. Each participant read one of five possible 7-word “Guilty” DRM
lists— a Control List, Confession List, DNA List, Eyewitness List, or Fingerprint List. These
five lists were the same 7-word list developed and used in Study 1 (Appendix C).
For the instructions and construction of the memory measures, see Appendix L.
Procedure:
Participants agreed to participate in what they told was an MTurk HIT composed of
two separate studies. In fact, the two studies were related: Part I was the Priming Phase,
and Part 2 was the DRM Phase. This method of ostensibly running two unrelated studies
has proven successful in the past for our lab (Lawson, 2014) at disguising the purpose of
primes from participants. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly
assigned to one of the 13 possible experimental cells, which dictated which priming
paragraph and which evidence “guilty” DRM list they saw.
In the Priming Phase, participants read an evidence priming paragraph (determined
by their group assignment), preceded and followed by similar, but unrelated, filler
paragraphs to maintain the cover story. Participants in the Control group and neutral prime
conditions read only the filler paragraphs.
After completing the Priming Phase, participants read a brief explanation of “the
second study” to maintain the cover story. After reading the instructions, participants
completed the DRM Phase, which was identical to the “guilty” list portion of Study 1b.
Participants viewed one of the five possible lists that corresponded to the evidence in the
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priming vignette from the Priming Phase (Control participants viewed the control list). For
example, participants who were in the Positive Confession and Negative Confession
conditions read different primes, but both viewed the “guilty” DRM list containing
“confession.” After viewing the 7-word “guilty” list, participants completed a five-minute
filler task, followed by a Free Recall memory test and a Recognition Test in which
participants rated words as Old or New, rated their confidence in their decision, and made
a “remember”, “know”, or “guess” judgment if they judged a word as “Old.” After completing
the memory tests, participants answered the exclusionary questions, including what they
thought the study was about, and then were debriefed.
Hypotheses:
H10: There will be a main effect for Prime Type, such that participants in the positive
prime condition will show more false alarms (both free and recognition) for “guilty,” higher
confidence for “guilty,” and more “remember” judgments than the participants who in the
no prime condition, which in turn will show more false alarms, higher confidence, and more
“remember” judgments than those in the negative prime condition.
H11: There will also be a main effect for Evidence DRM List, such that participants
who read the Confession or DNA list will show more false alarms (both free and
recognition) for “guilty,” higher confidence for “guilty,” and more “remember” judgments
than the participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list, which in turn will show
more false alarms, higher confidence, and more “remember” judgments than those in the
Control list condition.
H12: There will be a significant Prime Type x Evidence DRM List interaction, such that
participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list will be more affected by the
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positive and negative primes than participants who read the Confession or DNA lists. That
is, participants who read the Eyewitness or Fingerprint list will show greater (or fewer)
false alarms, greater (or less) confidence for “guilty,” and more (or fewer) “remember”
judgments compared to those in the corresponding neutral prime conditions than those
who read the Confession or DNA lists.
Based on our previous work, we expect these differences between groups to be
small effect sizes (Cohen’s d=0.20). Further, we expect small main effects as well (Cohen’s
f=0.25)
Results:
For Free Recall, Recognition Test, and Confidence Judgment results, data were
submitted to a 3(prime type: positive, negative, neutral) x 4 (evidence type: confession, DNA,
eyewitness, fingerprint) ANOVA. These analyses tested for the hypothesized Priming main
effect, Evidence List main effect, and Priming*Evidence List interaction. Because there was
no Control list equivalent to a positive or negative prime (focusing on the credibility aspect
of a single word on the list), we could not fully factorially-cross the Control condition, and
thus excluded it from analyses.
Free Response Overall, Free Response rates of “guilty” were fairly low: maximum
MControl=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .028], MEyewitnessNegative=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .29], and
MFingerprintNegative=0.18, 95% CI=[.07, .29]: minimum MDNA=0.04, 95% CI=[0.00, 0.10]. These
free recall rates are much lower than those found in Study 2b, but similar to those found in
Study 1b—a trend that is not surprising, given that we used the 7-word list format rather
than the story format.
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We found no support for a main effect of Prime Type, F(2, 591)=1.79, p=.169; no
main effect of Evidence List, F(3, 591)=0.36, p=.784; and no interaction between Prime
Type and Evidence List, F(6, 591)=1.18, p=.313.
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Figure 8. Study 3b Proportion of “guilty” responses to Free Recall Test

In order to investigate the possibility that priming may have affected some forms of
evidence more than others, we conducted a number of follow-up t-tests. Specifically, we
compared the free recall of “guilty” between the positive and negative conditions for each
evidence list. This resulted in four t-tests: Positive and Negative Confession; Positive and
Negative DNA; Positive and Negative Eyewitness; and Positive and Negative Fingerprint. We
reasoned that if priming had any effect on the activation of guilty, these comparisons would
be the most likely place to detect a significant difference. However, all of these t-tests
yielded non-significant results (p=[.130, .752]; See Appendix K). In fact, the highest rates of
guilty free recall occurred in the Negative Eyewitness and Negative Fingerprint conditions.
Thus, we found no support for any of our hypotheses in the Free Recall responses.
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Recognition Judgments Similar to the Free Recall rates, the Old/New judgments for
this study were similar to those in Study 1b; maximum: MPositiveConfession=0.74, 95% CI=[.61,
.87]; minimum: MNegativeEyewitness=0.52, 95% CI=[.38, .66] (Figure 9).
Similar to Free Recall results, we found no support for our hypotheses. There was
no main effect of Prime Type, F(2, 591)=1.13, p=.325, no main effect of Evidence List, F(3,
591)=0.74, p=.528, nor a significant interaction between Prime Type and Evidence List, F(6,
591)=0.14, p=.737. We again conducted comparison t-tests between the Positive and
Negative conditions for each form of evidence. None of these tests yielded significant
differences, p=[.060, .742]. It does bear mentioning that these data trend in the predicted
direction, however. Participants in the positive priming conditions false alarmed to guilty
more than participants in the negative priming conditions for the Confession lists
(MPositiveConfession=0.74, 95% CI=[.61, .87], MNegativeConfession=0.56, 95% CI=[.42, .70];
t(98)=1.90, p=.060), DNA lists (MPositiveDNA=0.62, 95% CI=[.48, .76], MNegativeDNA=0.56, 95%
CI=[.42, .70]; t(98)=0.61, p=.547), and Eyewitness lists (MPositiveEyewitness=0.60, 95% CI=[.46,
.74], MNegativeEyewitness=0.52, 95% CI=[.38, .66]; t(98)=0.80, p=.425). Participants who saw the
Fingerprint list showed the opposite pattern, (MPositiveFingerprint=0.61, 95% CI=[.47, .75],
MNegativeFingerprint=0.64, 95% CI=[.50, .78]; t(98)=0.33, p=.742). Although, again, these
differences are not significant, they suggest that priming may more reliably influence
Old/New judgments than Free Recall judgments.

75

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

Proportion Critiacl Lure FA
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DNA

Eyewitness

Fingerprint

List Type

Figure 9. Study 3b proportion of “Old” responses on Recognition Test

Confidence Judgments. Confidence judgments were similar to those in Study 1b,
ranging from a maximum: MControl=3.98, 95% CI=[3.67, 4.29], to minimum:
MNegativeFingerprint=3.33, 95% CI=[2.96, 3.71]. We found no significant main effect for Prime
Type, F(2, 591)=0.67, p=.499, no main effect for Evidence List, F(3, 591)=0.40, p=.754, and
no significant Prime Type * Evidence List interaction, F(6, 591)=1.51, p=.173. Follow-up ttests between the Positive and Negative conditions for each form of evidence also yielded
no significant differences: p=[.122, .719] (Appendix K). Thus, we found no support for any
of our hypotheses.
Interestingly, participants in the positive prime conditions expressed the lowest
confidence compared to their neutral and negative counterparts for the Confession lists,
Eyewitness lists, and Fingerprint lists. Participants in the positive DNA condition, on the
other hand, expressed higher confidence than those in the neutral DNA or negative DNA
conditions. Although none of these differences are statistically significant, it a surprising
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trend that the priming conditions we expected to yield the highest confidence in
recognition for “guilty” in fact yield the lowest (Figure 10).
5
4.5
4
3.5
3

Positive

2.5

Neutral

2

Negative

1.5
1
0.5
0
Control

Confession

DNA

Eyewitness

Fingerprint

Figure 10. Study 3b confidence for Recognition Test responses to “guilty”

R/K/G Results. Due to the ordinal nature of the remember/know/guess responses
and the two multi-level independent variables, the chi-square test used for Studies 1B and
2B was not an appropriate statistical test to use here. Specifically, we are interested in the
possibility of the interaction between Prime Type and Evidence List. Therefore, we
performed an ordinal regression with our independent variables, Prime Type and Evidence
List, as our predictors. This ordinal regression yielded a poor model fit for the data,
χ2(11)=7.19, p=.784. Indeed, the pseudo R-square revealed the model explained very little
of the variance (Nagelkerke R2 = .022), while the Test of Parallel Lines provided no
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the location parameters differed as a function of
experimental assignment (χ2(11)=10.16, p=.516). Therefore, we can conclude that neither
the Prime Type nor the Evidence List affected the phenomenological strength of false
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recognition of “guilty.” Further, there was no evidence of any interaction of the two
independent variables (Table 6).
Table 6
Study 3b R/K/G Ratings for “Old” guilty ratings
List Type
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

R
13
14
9
10

Positive
K
14
9
11
9

G
10
8
10
12

R
14
11
12
10
11

Neutral
K
8
9
10
13
6

G
8
9
12
5
16

R
11
7
11
10

Negative
K
9
12
8
14

G
8
9
7
8

Discussion:
Despite previous research showing strong effects of priming influencing how people
respond to DRM lists (Lenton, et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007), we found no support that
our evidence quality primes affected the activation of the “guilty” semantic network.
Participants did not show shifts in falsely recalling or recognizing “guilty,” nor did they
show any changes in confidence or phenomenological memory quality as a result of being
positively or negatively primed. Further, all four of our evidence forms showed no
susceptibility to priming.
There are several explanations for why we saw no effects here. One possibility is
that our primes, although successful in influencing explicit ratings of evidence quality, may
have lost their potency by the time participants viewed the DRM list. In pilot testing,
participants rated the evidence immediately after viewing the prime. However in Study 3b,
participants read a filler prime and DRM instructions before viewing the list, resulting in
approximately three minutes elapsing between the prime and reading the list, and over
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eight minutes between the prime and the free recall test. It may be that the admittedly
small effects we measured in pilot testing were insufficient to influence semantic activation
while viewing the list; it is also possible that the effects of the primes we did observe in 3a
were too short-lived and were thus over by the time participants viewed the list.
Another possibility is that changing the relationship between one word (the
evidence word) and guilty is not a strong enough effect to influence overall semantic
activation. Indeed, past research has primed the entire theme of the list; Lenton et al.
(2001) primed gender expectations, and Takarangi et al., (2007) primed violence. Here, we
focused our prime on a single word. If our speculation accounting for the lack of list
differences in Studies 1 and 2 is true that changing one word has a small, even negligible
effect on semantic activation, it also stands to reason that strengthening or weakening a
single word will also have no effect.
Our data did show several trends worth noting. First, negative and positive primes
did show the predicted trend for Recognition Test responses. Specifically, participants in
the Positive Confession condition false alarmed to “guilty” far more often than participants
in the Negative Confession condition. Although the t-test was not significant, it is possible
this result would be significant with more participants. Here we had only 50 participants
per group, whereas in past research we use 200 participants per cell. Given the exploratory
nature of this experiment, future research could use these results as a guide for more
specific, greater-powered use of this paradigm.
Despite the lack of significant findings here, we believe this paradigm is ripe for
further research. For example, our research question here was whether priming affected
the semantic relationship between a specific form of evidence and guilt. What we do not

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

79

know is how priming may affect the “guilty” list in general. For example, would more
thematic (as opposed to single word) priming influence activation of guilty? Perhaps
instead of focusing on a single form of evidence, a priming paragraph could depict a more
detailed right (positive) or wrongful (negative) conviction. If more globally-thematic
priming influences activation of guilty, how would such priming compare to priming other,
more traditional DRM lists?
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CHAPTER 14: GENERAL DISCUSSION
Because evidence sometimes leads to a conviction despite overwhelming proof of

innocence, we suspect that certain forms of evidence are strongly associated with guilt. As
such, hearing strongly guilt-associated evidence automatically and strongly activates the
thought of guilt—and later, people may remember “guilty” rather than the actual evidence.
Here, we tested for such automatic association with the DRM paradigm (Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) in a novel way. Specifically, we asked participants to read a group of
words related to “guilty” (but not “guilty” itself). Then, on a memory test for the words they
saw, participants incorrectly report seeing “guilty” because of a semantic activation error:
all of the “guilty”-related words activate the semantic network containing “guilty” and
participants mistake thinking of “guilty” for actually having read it. The stronger the
connection between the words participant read and “guilty,” the more likely they are to
falsely recall reading “guilty.” Therefore, the rate of false recall is an indirect measure of the
strength of automatic association—a measure we can use to detect the strength of
automatic association between evidence and guilt.
In this set of studies, we had participants read our “guilty” list, but varied a single
word between participants: namely, one form of evidence. Activation monitoring theory
suggests that participants who read the group of words containing evidence strongly
associated with “guilty” would falsely report having read “guilty” more than participants
reading more weakly associated evidence. For instance, if our hypothesis was correct,
participants reading “confession” (which often results in a conviction, even when it should
not; Kassin & Neumann, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997) or “DNA” (the “gold standard” of
evidence; National Academy of Sciences, 2009) should falsely recall “guilty” very often.
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Conversely, participants who read “eyewitness” (a form of evidence that is demonstrably
problematic; National Academy of Sciences, 2014) or “fingerprint” (which follows a general
methodology, but not always reliable; National Academy of Sciences, 2009) should have
falsely recalled “guilty” less often. In Study 1, we tested our hypothesis by listing six of our
“guilty” words and one form of evidence (the 7-word list format). In Study 2, we embedded
the six “guilty” words and one evidence word in a paragraph about the criminal justice
system (the “DRM Story” format) to increase the contextual information and potentially
alter activation of “guilty.” Finally, in Study 3, we influenced context in a different way by
providing participants with a vignette that described a piece of evidence as either reliable,
good evidence or unreliable, flawed evidence. We used this positive or negative
information to make that form of evidence more or less associated with “guilty,” —a shift
which, we expected, would be detectable using the DRM paradigm.
This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt at using the DRM as a tool to specifically
measure automatic associations. Although researchers have used the DRM variations we
used here (a 7-word list, Gallo, 2010; the DRM Story format, Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis,
2007; and using priming to alter the association network, Lenton, et al., 2001; Takarangi et
al., 2007), we had to adapt each approach for a “guilty” DRM list. Each of our new DRM
iterations successfully caused participants to falsely recall seeing “guilty” at rates similar to
established lists that exhibit very strong DRM effects (e.g. “sleep”). However, in each of our
studies, we detected no differences in false free recall, false recognition alarms, confidence,
or remember/know/guess judgments between participants who saw different evidence
lists. The single exception to this was the free recall rates for the “DNA” Story from Study
2b, which produced significantly higher false recall rates for “guilty” than the Control and
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Eyewitness Stories. Despite this singular success, simply put, we found little evidence to
support our hypotheses that different forms of evidence (confession and DNA) would yield
higher false recall for “guilty” in our applications of the DRM paradigm.
Why did we fail to detect changes in response in the DRM paradigm? One possibility
is that the associations between different form of evidence and guilt are not as automatic as
we suspected, and instead require additional cognition in order to create the association.
However, if this were the case, we would expect lists that contain a form of evidence would
generate lower false recall rates than the control list, due to weakening the semantic
activation with a non-associated word. Secondly, we would expect that participants who
view information cuing the context of the criminal justice system (e.g., the “guilty” story,
and the positive and negative evidence primes) would activate “guilty” and thus show
higher false recall for “guilty” than participants who did not receive such information. In
both cases, we did not find such a trend. Participants regularly responded with high rates of
false alarms to the “guilty” DRM list and story. Further, participants receiving additional
contextual information did not respond with more false recall than those that did not.
Notably, participants who viewed the “guilty” DRM story had far more false memories for
“guilty” in the free recall portion than did participants who viewed the list format;
however, the rates of recognition false alarms were extremely similar. If there were no
association, participants in the different Neutral priming conditions should show fewer
false memories and false alarms than those in the Negative priming condition—a trend we
did not find. Thus, we are confident the association is automatic, but the paradigms we
used here were insufficient to measure it. What remains unclear, however, is whether
different forms of evidence form automatic associations that differ in strength with “guilty.”
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There are a number of potential explanations for why we failed to measure
differential association strengths between different evidence and guilt. One explanation is
that the one-word alteration we use here is insufficient to change the activation strength of
“guilty.” Simply put, the network is activated by the first few words on the list immediately,
and remaining words do little to shift the activation strength. As such, the evidence
embedded in the middle of the list or story has a negligible effect on the overall activation
strength. We find this explanation to be the most probable for two reasons. First, it seems
that the effect of evidence type on activation strength is extremely weak, rather than nonexistent. Throughout our studies we found results that trend in the hypothesized
distribution of false recall, despite non-significant effects. This trend suggests that the
differential association strengths with “guilty” are ever-so-slightly pushing false recall rates
in the expected direction (up for confession and DNA; down for fingerprint and
eyewitness). We are not saying, of course, that our hypotheses are true despite lack of
statistical significance. Indeed, that each study finds a hypothesized trend in a different
measurement, but these do not replicate across studies does little to paint a clear picture.
For example, participants who saw the Confession List in Study 1b and the “positive
confession” prime and list in Study 3b reported more false alarms to “guilty” on the
Recognition Test than their counterparts; however, in Study 2b, Confession Story
participants produced among the lowest recognition false alarms. In Study 2b, the DNA
Story produced the most false memories on the Free Recall test, significantly more than the
Confession Story and Fingerprint Story but this finding did not replicate across any other
studies or memory measures. Thus, there seems to be an effect of evidence type on
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semantic activation—but it is of small size and large variability, and therefore extremely
difficult to pinpoint.
The trend in priming results from Study 3b provides a second potential reason for
why a single evidence word is insufficient to shift activation strength. Although we found
no main effect for priming, the Recognition Test results do show a general trend towards
more false alarms for the positive primes than the negative primes, albeit not at a
significant level. These results suggest that our use of the DRM paradigm is capable of
detecting changes in association strength. Particularly, it seems that the DNA list may have
been more resistant to priming than other forms of evidence—a trend we predicted
because the association with guilt is very difficult to move, given that DNA is so widelytrusted and reliable. On the other hand, confession, eyewitness, and fingerprint generally
had higher false alarm rates for the positive prime conditions than the negative prime
conditions. Perhaps if the study were more highly powered, the differences between
positive and negative priming conditions would become significant for confession,
eyewitness, and fingerprint, but not for DNA. Again, although this is purely speculative, the
results suggest that some forms of evidence yield different false recall results than others,
but, notably, to a very small degree.
Another potential explanation for why we did not observe differential activation
strength is that the semantic activation is not a reasoning judgment (“That person is
guilty”) but instead definitional (“Guilt exists in the criminal justice system”). Indeed,
“innocent” is one of our list words—the opposite of “guilty.” Participants may be activating
“guilty” in a way that is quite different from a juror making an assessment of a defendant.
After all, we are aware of no evidence that reading a DRM list affects a person’s judgments
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or decision-making outside of that DRM task—for example, reading the “sleep” list does not
make you sleepy, or decide to go to sleep. Study 3b provides weak evidence that supports
the proposition that the semantic activation of “guilty” is different from determining
whether someone is guilty. If participants are behaving in the decision-making manner of
jurors, those in the negative prime conditions who read a vignette of a wrongfully
convicted person should, activate “innocent” and suppress its opposite, “guilty.” Activating
“innocent” should lead to lower false recall for “guilty” on the DRM rate. However, we found
no main effect for Prime Type (nor significant differences between false recall rates for the
negative and positive for each evidence type), suggesting that both negative and positive
prime participants were processing the “guilty” list in the same way. Thus, perhaps
participants that have cued “guilty” due to spreading activation are thinking of “guilty” in a
qualitatively different way from jurors who are assessing guilt.
Future Research
Despite our lack of significant results, we believe there may yet be hope for using
the DRM paradigm in this way. Each of our three studies yielded interesting trends, if not
support for our hypotheses. Study 1 suggests that the forward associative strength of the
list words may not always predict activation strength of the critical lure; and yet, our 7word list still functioned very similarly to the 14-word list structure in terms of false
alarms and confidence. In Study 2, the Story format yielded surprisingly high rates of Free
Recall and Recognition test false recall for “guilty.” In Study 3, we found no main effects or
interactions, but think that a more highly-powered study may yield significant differences
between the positively- and negatively-primed evidence lists. As such, this project has
raised a number of new questions that explore how the DRM paradigm works. For example,
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we wonder if our “guilty” list functions differently from other DRM lists, given the
surprising effects of weaker-associated words (Study 1) and the high rates of false
memories and false alarms from the “guilty” Story (Study 2). Are participants processing
these criminal justice-related words in a way different from other, more concrete DRM
lists? Although we found our list functioned similarly to the “chair” list and “sleep” story
(although, in many cases, not identically; See Appendix D and G), future research should
investigate other aspects that differ between the “guilty” and other DRM lists and stories
that may account for our unexpected results.
The lack of priming effects was also surprising, given its success in past research
(Lenton et al., 2001; Takarangi et al., 2007). As noted previously, these studies primed the
entire content of the list, whereas we only primed the strength of association between one
word and the critical lure. We are curious whether single-word priming would affect
semantic activation for other, traditional DRM lists. Further, we suspect that a prime that
affects the entirety of the “guilty” list—perhaps using ambiguous guilt-related words
(Takarangi et al., 2007) would be more effective in altering how participants activate the
“guilty” network.
Given the applied nature of this set of studies, a logical next step for this paradigm is
assessing how it could be used in the real world. Although it is clear that further research is
necessary before it would be plausible to take this paradigm out of the lab, such future
research should focus on the specific applied situations for which it is suited—for example,
how this paradigm can be used as a tool with mock trial designs. We are interested in how
situational factors influence responses to the “guilty” DRM list and story. Do jurors respond
differently to the list after a prosecution’s case in chief than after a defense’s? Do individual
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differences such as being a police officer have an effect? In some cases (Study 1b and Study
2b), we found contact with the criminal justice system changed our pattern of results.
Given these comparisons were only a fraction of our required sample size, and significant
differences are eliminated when combined with the overall sample, we are hesitant to
interpret them as meaningful. However, these differences suggest contact with the criminal
justice system may indeed be such an important individual difference. We need a better
understanding of how the “guilty” DRM list and story works, but we think it has potential
for real-world application.
Despite overall lack of support for our hypotheses that we could measure
differential activation of “guilty” between different forms of evidence, our results do raise a
number of theoretical and applied research questions for future research. We think that
our novel use of the extensively-used and well-understood DRM paradigm lays the
groundwork for a simple, effective tool for understanding a potential cause of wrongful
conviction.
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Appendix A
Forward Associative Task Results
Word

List
Associative
Word
List
Associative
Position
Strength
Position
Strength
Jury
1
47%
Jail
8
24%
Crime
2
44%
Murder*
9
17%
Judge
3
44%
Convict
10
20%
Court
4
39%
Shame
11
17%
Criminal
5
27%
Lawyer
12
15%
Innocent
6
24%
Verdict
13
10%
Trial
7
24%
Sentence
14
10%
*”Murder” was listed as the 9th word due to the fact that other specific crimes (robbery,
stealing, etc.) were occasionally listed by participants.
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Appendix B
Exclusion Criteria
Question

Excluded if responded…

1. Did you complete the experiment in
a single session, without stopping?
2. Did you pause or leave the
experiment to engage in other tasks?
3. Did you use your web browser’s
back or refresh buttons during the
experiment?
4. Did you complete the experiment
without anyone helping you?
5. Did you speak with anyone at any
time during the experiment?
5. Did you use a search engine at any
point to look anything up?

No

6. Did you take notes?
7. Did you (intentionally or
unintentionally) rewind or restart the
video showing the list?*
8. Did you experience any of the
following technical difficulties? Video
Problems; Survey restarted; Other.
Please Specify

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes for video problems and survey
restart; “Other” responses were
assessed by the researcher

Rationale
Memory confound (unknown decay
time between list and test)
Memory confound (unknown decay
time between list and test)
May have disrupted Qualtrics
progression and assignment
Memory confound (memory aid,
distraction from encoding, etc.)
Memory confound (memory aid,
distraction from encoding, etc.)
Memory confound (memory aid,
distraction from encoding, etc.); in
Study 3, potential interference with
primes
Memory confound (memory aid)
Memory confound (multiple exposure
to words)
May interfere with Qualtrics group
assignment; Video Problems may
affect ability to remember words.

*Question 7 was not used as an exclusion rule for Study 2, as the Story was not presented in a
video.
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Appendix C
Study 1a Word Lists
Guilty List
Strong Association: jury, crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial
Medium Association: court, criminal, innocent, trial, jail, murder, convict
Weak Association: jail, murder, convict, shame, lawyer, verdict, sentence
Medium-Strong: crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial, jail
Chair List
Strong Association: desk, cushion, couch, bench, sit, swivel, sofa
Moderate Association: bench, sit, swivel, sofa, recliner, rocking, sitting
Weak Association: recliner, rocking, sitting, legs, table, seat, wood
Study 1b Word Lists
Guilty List
Control: jury, crime, judge, court, criminal, innocent, trial
Confession: jury, crime, judge, confession, court, criminal, innocent
DNA: jury, crime, judge, DNA, court, criminal, innocent
Eyewitness: jury, crime, judge, eyewitness, court, criminal, innocent
Fingerprint: jury, crime, judge, fingerprint, court, criminal, innocent
*Guilty Lists containing evidence constructed by dropping “trial” and have the evidence
word inserted as the fourth word.
Chair List
Control: desk, cushion, couch, bench, sit, swivel, sofa
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Appendix D
Study 1b “Guilty” and “Chair” List Descriptives and Comparisons
Item
Type
Critical
Lure

List

Free Recall
(SD)

Recognition
(SD)

Confidence
(SD)

Remember
(*)

Guilty

.08 (.27)

.50 (.50)

3.73 (1.19)

174 (.344)

Chair

.43 (.50)

.79 (.41)

3.98 (1.13)

p<.000;
d=.649
4.90 (1.45)
-

p<.000;
d=.179
3.54 (0.84)
4.62 (0.55)
p<.000;
d=1.165
4.58 (0.69)
4.36 (0.90)
p<.000;
d=.286
3.68 (1.26)

Guilty

-

p<.000;
d=.506
.91 (.18)
.93 (.17)
p=.016;
d=.076
.03 (.12)
.04 (.13)
p=.031;
d=.068
.31 (.46)

Chair

-

.41 (.49)

3.53 (1.22)

p<.000;
d=.177

p<.000;
d=.110

(Proportions)
Old

Guilty
Chair
(Counts)

New

Guilty
Chair
(Counts)

Weak
Lure

(Proportions)

.53 (1.03)
-

Know
(*)

Guess
(*)

186
145
(.369)
(.287)
399 (.498)
285
118
(.355)
(.147)
McNemar-Bowker p<.000
2.25 (.89)
2.26 (.90)
p=.616

.39 (.74)
.42 (.71)
p=.243

.10 (.33)
.11 (.35)
p=.664

.01 (.14)
.02 (.16)
p=.446

.02 (.18)
.03 (.20)
p=.124

.04 (.27)
.06 (.30)
p=.169

63 (.201)

104
146
(.332)
(.466)
84 (.201)
171
162
(.410)
(.388)
McNemar-Bowker p<.000

Notes
1. Bolded values are those that are significantly different (p<.05) between the two lists. Actual
p-value and effect size (if applicable) reported below each set of values.
2. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test.
3. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.”
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”
*4. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.
5. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential
statistics.
6. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three
old words, and three new words). Thus, we report the mean number of R responses, K
responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these values do not add up to 3
because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a R/K/G judgment.
*7. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for
each value.
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Study 1 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square
X2(8, N=71)=13.00, p=.369.
Condition
First Third
Middle Third
Last Third
Total
a
a
a
Control
0
0
17
17
Confession
0a
3a
12a
15
a
a
a
DNA
0
1
8
9
Eyewitness
1a
4a
10a
15
Fingerprint
0a
2a
13a
15
Total
1
10
60
71
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
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Appendix E
Study 1b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses
Free Recall
Group
Control

Mean
.09 [.05, .13]

Confession

.08 [.04, .12]

DNA

.05 [.02, .08]

EW

.07 [.04, .11]

Group
Confession
DNA
EW
FP
DNA
EW
FP
EW
FP
FP

Mean
.08 [.04, .12]
.05 [.02, .08]
.07 [.04, .11]
.08 [.04, .12]

t-test
t(404)=0.44
t(408)=1.71
t(414)=0.65
t(396)=0.31
t(402)=1.27
t(412)=0.20
t(390)=0.12
t(416)=1.09
t(394)=1.39
t(404)=0.32

p value
p=.662
p=.088
p=.518
p=.755
p=.205
p=.843
p=.904
p=.277
p=.169
p=.750

d value
d=.03 [.01, .07]
d=.16 [.13, .18]
d=.07 [.05, .10]
d=.04 [.01, .06]
d=.12 [.10, .15]
d=.04 [.01, .07]
d=.00 [-.03, .03]
d=.08 [.06, .12]
d=.12 [.10, .15]
d=.04 [.01, .06]

Group
Confession
DNA
EW
FP
DNA
EW
FP
EW
FP
FP

Mean
.53 [.46, .60]
.46 [.39, .52]
.51 [.44, .58]
.51 [.44, .58]

t-test
t(404)=0.99
t(408)=0.50
t(414)=0.59
t(396)=0.59
t(402)=1.49
t(412)=0.42
t(390)=0.39
t(416)=1.09
t(394)=1.08
t(404)=0.02

p value
p=.321
p=.617
p=.557
p=.553
p=.137
p=.675
p=.403
p=.275
p=.279
p=.983

d value
d=.10 [.05, .15]
d=.04 [-.01, .09]
d=.06 [.01, .11]
d=.06 [.01, .11]
d=.14 [.09, .19]
d=.04 [-.01, .09]
d=.04 [-.01, .09]
d=.10 [.05, .15]
d=.10 [.05, .15]
d=.00 [-.05, .05]

Group
Confession

Mean
3.60 [3.43,
3.77]
3.80 [3.65,
3.96]
3.70 [3.53,
3.86]
3.70 [3.53,
3.88]

t-test
t(404)=1.95

p value
p=.052

d value
d=.19 [.08, .31]

t(408)=0.23

p=.817

d=.03 [-.08, .14]

t(414)=1.15

p=.250

d=.11 [.00, .22]

t(396)=1.05

p=.293

d=.11 [-.01, .23]

t(402)=1.77

p=.078

d=.17 [.06, .29]

EW
FP
EW

t(412)=0.81
t(390)=0.84
t(416)=0.95

p=.418
p=.403
p=.344

d=.08 [-.03, .20]
d=.08 [-.04, .20]
d=.09 [-.03, .20]

FP
FP

t(394)=0.86
t(404)=0.06

p=.393
p=.955

d=.08 [-.03, .20]
d=.00 [-.12, .12]

Recognition (Old/New)
Group
Control

Mean
.48 [.41, .55]

Confession

.53 [.46, .60]

DNA

.46 [.39, .52]

EW

.51 [.44, .58]

Confidence
Group
Control

Mean
3.83 [3.67,
3.99]

DNA
EW
FP
Confession

3.60 [3.43,
3.77]

DNA

3.80 [3.65,
3.96]

EW

3.70 [3.53,
3.86]

DNA
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Study 1 Free Recall Chi-Square Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=1016)=3.09, p=.543.
Condition
Absent in FR
Present in FR
Total
a
a
Control
184
16
200
a
a
Confession
187
19
206
DNA
194a
10a
204
a
a
Eyewitness
198
16
214
Fingerprint
176a
16a
192
Total
939
77
1016
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
Study 1 Recognition Test Chi-Square Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=1016)=2.74, p=.602.
Condition
“New”
“Old”
Total
Control
107a
99a
206
a
a
Confession
94
106
200
DNA
111a
93a
204
a
a
Eyewitness
105
109
214
Fingerprint
94a
98a
192
Total
511
505
1016
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
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Appendix F
Study 2 DRM Story Format
DRM Story Paragraph (14 words):

A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family
members and interested community members can be present in the court4 as well. If a person loses,
they will be considered a criminal5. If they win, they are usually innocent6 and show this by the end of
the trial7. If they lose, they are sent to jail8, especially for murder9. They are also labeled as a convict10,
which sometimes makes them feel shame11. Of course, a person is not alone – they usually have a
lawyer12 on their side to argue before the verdict13, as well as help them get a fair sentence14. Thus,
many people are involved in the system.

DRM Story Paragraph (7 words) Control:
A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. In some cases, family
members and interested community members can be present in the court4 as well. If a person loses,
they will be considered a criminal5. If they win, they are usually innocent6 and show this by the end of
the trial7.

DRM Story Paragraph (7 words) evidence variations:
A jury1 is a group of normal citizens that reviews information in a case to determine whether a crime2
has been committed. The judge3 provides order and gives instructions. They also make sure that
evidence, such as _________4 is presented. In some cases, family members and interested community
members can be present in the court5 as well. If a person loses, they will be considered a criminal6. If
they win, they are usually innocent7.

DRM words are italicized and numbered with superscripts.
Sleep Story (14 words):
Sally lay in bed. She needed to rest but she was still awake even though she was so tired. Finally she
nodded off and began to dream. She did not want to wake up. She began to snooze and wrapped her
blanket tightly around her. Sally quickly fell from a doze to a deep slumber and began to snore more
heavily. Sally lay there in peace until she woke up and let out a big yawn. She was still drowsy.
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Appendix G
Study 2b “Guilty” and “Sleep” Story Descriptives and Comparisons
Item
Type
Critical
Lure

Story

Free Recall
(SD)

Recognition
(SD)

Confidence
(SD)

Remember
(*)

Guilty

.56 (.50)

.87 (.34)

4.40 (.96)

602 (.690)

Sleep

.86 (.35)

.93 (.25)

4.48 (.85)

p<.000;
d=.540
3.66 (1.68)
-

p<.000;
d=.189
.95 (.17)
.68 (.20)

p=.013;
d=.078
4.68 (.56)
3.94 (.68)

-

p<.000;
d=1.172
.05 (.14)
.05 (.14)

p<.000;
d=1.025
4.42 (.62)
4.35 (.71)

p<.000;
d=.368
.03 (.17)
.07 (.31)

p=.523

p<.000;
d=.117
75 (.180)

(Proportions)
Old

Guilty
Sleep
(Counts)

New

Guilty
Sleep

Guilty

-

.42 (.49)

p<.001;
d=.105
3.62 (1.19)

Sleep

-

.85 (.36)

4.32 (1.01)

p<.000;
d=.501

p<.000;
d=.540

(Counts)
Weak
Lure

(Proportions)

Know
(*)

Guess
(*)

219
52 (.060)
(.251)
678 (.719)
230
35 (.037)
(.244)
McNemar-Bowker p<.000
2.32 (.97)
1.81 (1.2)

.43 (.79)
1.06
(1.0)
p<.000;
d=.530
.04 (.21)
.11 (.39)

.10 (.35)
.55 (.81)
p<.000;
d=.563
.08 (.32)
.16
(.519)
p<.000;
d=.134
156
(.374)
62 (.073)

p<.000;
d=.160
186
(.446)
613 (.719)
178
(.207)
McNemar-Bowker p<.000

Notes
1. Bolded values are those that are significantly different (p<.05) between the two lists. Actual
p-value and effect size (if applicable) reported below each set of values.
2. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test.
3. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.”
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”
*4. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.
5. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential
statistics.
6. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three
old words, and three new words for “guilty”; six and six for “sleep”). Thus, we report the mean
number of R responses, K responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these
values do not add up to 3/6 because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a
R/K/G judgment.
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*7. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for
each value.
Study 2 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square
X2(8, N=566)=16.47, p=.036.
Condition
First Third
Middle Third
Last Third
Total
a
ab
b
Control
23
29
53
114
Confession
17a
29a
68a
105
a
a
a
DNA
15
30
86
131
Eyewitness
13a
22a
65a
100
a
ab
b
Fingerprint
7
26
83
116
Total
75
136
355
566
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
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Appendix H
Study 2b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses
Free Recall
Group
Control

Mean
.51 [.45, .58]

Confession

.55 [.49, .62]

DNA

.66 [.59, .72]

EW

.50 [.43, .57]

Group
Confession
DNA
EW
FP
DNA
EW
FP
EW
FP
FP

Mean
.55 [.49, .62]
.66 [.59, .72]
.50 [.43, .57]
.57 [.50, .59]

t-test
t(404)=0.80
t(403)=2.92
t(402)=0.30
t(404)=1.10
t(401)=2.11
t(400)=1.09
t(402)=0.30
t(399)=3.21
t(401)=1.80
t(400)=1.39

p value
p=.423
p=.004
p=.768
p=.271
p=.036
p=.275
p=.764
p=.001
p=.087
p=.164

d value
d=.08 [.03, .13]
d=.31 [.26, .35]
d=.02 [-.03, .07]
d=.12 [.07, .17]
d=.23 [.18, .27]
d=.10 [.05, .15]
d=.04 [-.01, .09]
d=.33 [.28, .38]
d=.17 [.14, .23]
d=.14 [.09, .19]

Group
Confession
DNA
EW
FP
DNA
EW
FP
EW
FP
FP

Mean
.85 [.80, .90]
.89 [.84, .93]
.89 [.84, .93]
.86 [.81, .91]

t-test
t(404)=0.23
t(403)=1.25
t(402)=1.23
t(404)=0.52
t(401)=1.01
t(400)=0.99
t(402)=0.28
t(399)=0.02
t(401)=0.73
t(400)=0.71

p value
p=.816
p=.214
p=.221
p=.605
p=.313
p=.322
p=.777
p=.986
p=.467
p=.478

d value
d=.03 [-.01, .06]
d=.15 [.11, .18]
d=.15 [.11, .18]
d=.06 [.09, .02]
d=.12 [.09, .15]
d=.12 [.09, .15]
d=.03 [-.01, .06]
d=.00 [-.03, .03]
d=.09 [.06, .12]
d=.09 [.06, .12]

Group
Confession

Mean
4.39 [4.25, 4.52]

t-test
t(404)=1.18

p value
p=.239

d value
d=.12 [.02, .22]

DNA
EW
FP
DNA

4.45 [4.32, 4.58]
4.41 [4.28, 4.54]
4.47 [4.35, 4.59]

t(403)=1.80
t(402)=1.42
t(404)=2.09
t(401)=0.65

p=.073
p=.156
p=.037
p=.516

d=.18 [.08, .28]
d=.14 [.05, .24]
d=.21 [.14, .30]
d=.15 [.11, .18]

EW
FP
EW

t(400)=0.25
t(402)=0.92
t(399)=0.40

p=.801
p=.358
p=.691

d=.06 [-.03, .16]
d=.09 [.00, .18]
d=.04 [-.05, .14]

FP
FP

t(401)=0.25
t(400)=0.66

p=.806
p=.510

d=.02 [-.07, .11]
d=.07 [-.02, .16]

Recognition (Old/New)
Group
Control

Mean
.84 [.79, .89]

Confession

.85 [.80, .90]

DNA

.89 [.84, .93]

EW

.89 [.84, .93]

Confidence
Group
Control

Confession

Mean
4.27 [4.13,
4.41]

4.39 [4.25,
4.52]

DNA

4.45 [4.32,
4.58]

EW

4.47 [4.35,
4.59]
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Study 2b Free Recall Chi-Square Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=1009)=12.34, p=.015.

Condition
Absent in FR
Present in FR
Total
a
a
Control
99
105
204
Confession
90a
112a
202
a
b
DNA
69
132
201
Eyewitness
100a
100a
200
a
a
Fingerprint
87
115
202
Total
445
564
1009
Note: Matching subscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
Study 2b Recognition Test Chi-Square Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=1009)=2.59, p=.629.
Condition
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint
Total

“New”
32a
30a
23a
23a
28a
136

“Old”
172a
172a
178a
177a
174a
873

Total
204
202
201
200
202
1009
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Appendix I

Study 3b Evidence Prime Vignettes
We report here the final version of each vignette. These vignettes were piloted across three
samples, with content added to each sample. The content added to the second version
(Sample 2) is demarcated by an underline; the content added to the third version (Sample
3) is italicized.
Confession – Positive
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently convicted of first degree murder after a two-day trial.
Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of another Milwaukee man, Sam Perkins. After
Perkins did not report for work for two days, police went to his house where they found his body.
Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary investigation revealed a connection between Watkins
and Perkins.
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The jury found
Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, because it contained many accurate details, and
the police gathered it using correct, standard interrogation methods, making it very reliable and
likely true. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a person will rarely confess to a crime they
did not commit. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is reliable and is often
correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence should be very
convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Watkins’ confession was key in
making sure the right person was brought to justice.

Confession – Negative
Tom Watkins, of Milwaukee, WI, was recently exonerated after being wrongfully convicted of first
degree murder based on improper evidence. Police identified Watkins as a suspect in the murder of
another Milwaukee man, Sam Perkins. After Perkins did not report for work for two days, police
went to his house where they found his body. Police arrested Watkins after a preliminary
investigation revealed a connection between Watkins and Perkins.
At trial, Watkins was convicted based primarily on his confession to the crime. The jury found
Watkins’ confession to be very compelling evidence, despite it containing many inaccurate details,
and the police gathering it using problematic, coercive interrogation methods, making it unreliable
and likely false. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that a person will often confess to a crime
they did not commit. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that a confession is not always reliable
and can be incorrect, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that confession evidence should not
be completely convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Watkins’ confession
was key in his wrongful conviction.

DNA – Positive
After a three-day trial, Andrew Simpson was recently convicted of first degree murder. Police
discovered the body of a man from Omaha, Nebraska, named Timothy Rico, in a dumpster behind a
convenience store. The police identified Simpson as a person of interest after discovering he worked
with Rico in the convenience store. After the police located Simpson, he was arrested and charged
with the crime.
At trial, Simpson was convicted based primarily on his DNA being found on Rico’s body. The jury
found the DNA to be very compelling evidence because the DNA sample was appropriately gathered,
using the correct, standard methods, and analyzed accurately, making the match very reliable.
Further, the jury heard expert testimony that DNA found on a body is rarely from someone other
than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that DNA evidence is reliable and is often

AUTOMATICALLY GUILTY

101

correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that DNA evidence should be very convincing that
the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Simpson’s DNA was key in making sure the right
person was brought to justice.

DNA – Negative

A judge recently overturned Andrew Simpson’s conviction, based on admittance of improper
evidence. Previously, after a three-day trial, Andrew Simpson was wrongly convicted of first degree
murder. Police discovered the body of a man from Omaha, Nebraska, named Timothy Rico, in a
dumpster behind a convenience store. The police identified Simpson as a person of interest after
discovering he worked with Rico in the convenience store. After the police located Simpson, he was
arrested and charged with the crime.
At trial, Simpson was convicted based primarily on flawed evidence that his DNA was found on Rico’s
body. The jury found the DNA to be very compelling evidence, despite it being incorrectly gathered,
and analyzed using an untested method that was shown to produce inaccuracies, making the match
very unreliable. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that DNA found on a body is commonly
from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that DNA is not always
reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that DNA evidence should not
be completely convincing that the defendant committed the crime. Therefore, Simpson’s DNA was
key in his wrongful conviction.

Eyewitness – Positive
A Kansas City man named Robert Keller was convicted of first degree murder this week. Neighbors
discovered the body of Rick Alleto in his truck, parked outside his own home, apparently the victim
of a gunshot wound to the head. After speaking with neighbors, the police arrested Keller on
suspicion of murder. After a week-long investigation, the prosecutor formally charged Keller with the
homicide.
At trial, Keller was convicted based primarily on testimony from an eyewitness who said he saw
Keller leaving Alleto’s house. The jury found the eyewitness’s identification to be very compelling
evidence, because the police used proper, unbiased lineup procedures, and the eyewitness expressed
high confidence in his identification, making it very reliable. Further, the jury heard expert testimony
that under the circumstances surrounding Alleto’s death, the eyewitness had a good view of the
defendant and would be able to make an accurate identification. After the trial, the judge offered an
opinion that an eyewitness is reliable and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote
that eyewitness evidence should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime.
Therefore, the eyewitness testimony was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.

Eyewitness - Negative
A Kansas City man named Robert Keller was exonerated this week after being wrongfully convicted
of first degree murder based on improper evidence. Neighbors discovered the body of Rick Alleto in
his truck, parked outside his own home, apparently the victim of a gunshot wound to the head. After
speaking with neighbors, the police arrested Keller on suspicion of murder. After a week-long
investigation, the prosecutor formally charged Keller with the homicide.
At trial, Keller was convicted based primarily on testimony from an eyewitness who said he saw
Keller leaving Alleto’s house. The jury found the eyewitness’s identification to be very compelling
evidence, despite the police having used faulty, contaminated lineup procedures, and the eyewitness
expressing low confidence in his identification, making it very unreliable. Further, the jury heard
expert testimony that under the circumstances surrounding Alleto’s death, the eyewitness had a poor
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view of the defendant and would be unable to make an accurate identification. After the trial, the
judge offered an opinion that an eyewitness is not always reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this
case. The judge also wrote that eyewitness evidence should not be completely convincing that the
defendant committed the crime. Therefore, the eyewitness testimony was key in Keller’s wrongful
conviction.

Fingerprint – Positive
After a 10-day trial, Mark Hampton of Gary, Indiana, was convicted of first degree murder. A month
after being reported missing by his son, the police found the body of Samuel Lithgow in a Gary,
Indiana landfill. The police uncovered forensic evidence of Hampton’s involvement, and the state
prosecutor charged Hampton with the crime.
At trial, Hampton was convicted based primarily on his fingerprint being found on Lithgow’s body.
The jury found the fingerprint to be very compelling evidence, because it was collected using
standard methods, under pristine conditions, and analyzed by an experienced forensic examiner,
leading to a very reliable match. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that fingerprints found on a
body are rarely from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge offered an opinion that
fingerprinting is reliable and is often correct, as it was in this case. The judge also wrote that a
fingerprint match evidence should be very convincing that the defendant committed the crime.
Therefore, Hampton’s fingerprint was key in making sure the right person was brought to justice.

Fingerprint – Negative
After a second trial, a judge overturned the conviction of Mark Hampton of Gary, Indiana. Previously,
Hampton was wrongfully convicted of first degree murder based on improper evidence. A month
after being reported missing by his son, the police found the body of Samuel Lithgow in a Gary,
Indiana landfill. The police uncovered forensic evidence of Hampton’s involvement, and the state
prosecutor charged Hampton with the crime.
At trial, Hampton was convicted based primarily on his fingerprint being found on Lithgow’s body.
The jury found the fingerprint to be very compelling evidence, despite it being collected using
incorrect methods, under conditions that degraded the sample, and analyzed by a forensic examiner
still in training, leading to an inaccurate match. Further, the jury heard expert testimony that
fingerprints found on a body are often from someone other than the killer. After the trial, the judge
offered an opinion that fingerprinting is not always reliable and can be incorrect, as it was in this case.
The judge also wrote that a fingerprint should not be completely convincing that the defendant
committed the crime. Therefore, Hampton’s fingerprint was key in his wrongful conviction.

Filler Paragraphs
1.
Wally Taylor, at the age of 55, began experiencing extreme headaches, blackouts, migraines, and
trouble concentrating. He first noticed these symptoms when he had trouble performing his job.
After approximately two months of these symptoms, he was rushed to the hospital after blacking out
at his daughter’s track meet. There, he met with a neurologist.
During his hospital visit, Taylor’s neurologist ran a number of medical tests including MRI and CT
scans. Taylor was kept in the hospital for one night for observation, but quickly released because
preliminary tests showed no obvious cause for the blackouts. After another month of testing, the
neurologist diagnosed Taylor with a small brain tumor. The neurologist concluded that because the
tumor was so small, it was difficult to find on the brain scans. The neurologist also recommended that
surgery would be extremely effective, as the tumor was so small and had not yet spread to any other
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areas of the brain. With surgery and a short round of chemotherapy, Wally Taylor will likely make a
remarkably fast and successful recovery.
2.
Gregory Sanford is a successful chef at a popular Minneapolis, MN steak restaurant. He has won many
awards for his cooking abilities and received international recognition for his innovative recipes.
Sanford was hired to his current job in 2012, after the restaurant’s owner read an article about
Sanford and his creative fusion of Caribbean and Americana cuisine.
This year, a high-profile business CEO hated one of Sanford’s new dishes and complained about the
meal both on the internet and directly to the restaurant owner. The athlete complained that the meal
was overcooked and not properly seasoned, and that the quality of the meat and vegetables in the
meal was extremely low. The manager concluded that Sanford was at fault for the terrible meal, and
fired him. The manager reasoned that Sanford should have paid extra care to the athlete’s meal.
Further, Sanford is ultimately responsible for the quality of the food the restaurant orders, so if the
food is low quality it is because Sanford was either cutting costs or not monitoring the orders.
Although the owner provided Sanford severance pay, the owner has stated he would not recommend
Sanford for any other jobs.
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Appendix J
Study 3b “Guilty” List Descriptives
Item
Type
Critical
Lure
Old
New
Weak
Lure

List

Free Recall
(SD)

Recognition
(SD)

Confidence
(SD)

Remember
(*)

Know
(*)

Guess
(*)

Guilty

.11 (.31)

.61 (.49)

3.57 (1.18)

143 (.360)

Guilty
Guilty
Guilty

4.49 (1.40)
.82 (1.37)
-

.85 (.19)
.03
.37 (.48)

3.28 (.47)
(.14)
3.55 (1.21)

2.01 (.83)
.02 (.19)
33 (.134)

132
(.332)
.39 (.67)
.04 (.23)
86 (.351)

122
(.307)
.17 (.41)
.04 (.25)
126
(.514)

Notes
1. For Critical Lure and Weak Lure Free Recall and Recognition values, we report the
proportion of participants that indicated they had seen the words on the list—either by
including it in their Free Recall response, or by selecting “Old” in the Recognition Test.
2. For Old and New Word Recognition, we report the mean number of those words
categorized as “Old” on the recognition test. Thus, higher values for Old words indicate higher
accuracy in categorization; a score of 1.0 would signify categorizing all Old words as “Old.”
Conversely, lower values for New words indicate higher accuracy in categorization; a score of
0 would signify categorizing all New words as “New.”
*3. R/K/G for Critical Lure and Weak Lure, frequencies are reported (e.g., the number of
participants who responded R/K/G) because participants could only respond with one value.
4. The value in parentheses for Critical Lure and Weak Lure report the percentage of each
response type within all “Old” responses. These values were not used for any inferential
statistics.
5. For R/K/G Old and New words, the recognition test contained three of each type (e.g., three
old words, and three new words). Thus, we report the mean number of R responses, K
responses, and G responses for each participant. Note that these values do not add up to 3
because only participants who labeled a word as “Old” made a R/K/G judgment.
*6. The value in parentheses for Old and New Words represents the standard deviation for
each value.
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Study 2 “Guilty” Placement Chi Square
X2(24, N=72)=31.19, p=.148. (Overall Chi Square)
Condition
First Third
Middle Third
Last Third
Total
a
a
a
Control
0
2
7
9
Confession0a
1a
5a
6
a
a
a
Confession
0
3
1
4
Confession+
0a
0a
5a
5
a
a
a
DNA0
1
1
2
DNA
0a
1a
4a
5
a
a
a
DNA+
0
1
5
6
Eyewitness0a
1a
8a
9
a
a
a
Eyewitness
0
1
3
4
Eyewitness+
0a
2a
3a
5
a
a
a
Fingerprint0
0
9
9
Fingerprint
1a
1a
2a
4
a
a
a
Fingerprint+
0
1
3
4
Total
1
15
56
72
Note: Matching superscript letters indicate categories whose column proportions do not differ
significantly at p=.05 level.
X2(4, N=72)=4.99, p=.288. (Priming Condition Chi Square)
X2(8, N=72)=4.29, p=.830. (Evidence List Chi Square)
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Appendix K
Study 3b t-Tests and Alternate Analyses
Free Recall
List
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Prime
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative

Mean [95% CI]
.18 [.07, .28]
.08 [.00, .16]
.10 [.01, .19]
.12 [.03, .21]
.10 [.01, .18]
.10 [.01, .19]
.04 [-.02, .10]
.06 [-.01, .13]
.10 [.01, .19]
.18 [.07, .29]
.06 [-.01, .13]
.08 [.00, .15]
.18 [.09, .27]

Positive-Negative comparison

Mean [95% CI]
.57 [.43, .71]
.60 [.46, .74]
.74 [.61, .87]
.56 [.42, .70]
.67 [.53, .80]
.62 [.48, .76]
.56 [.42, .70]
.56 [.42, .70]
.60 [.46, .74]
.52 [.38, .66]
.65 [.51, .78]
.61 [.47, .75]
.64 [.50, .78]

Positive-Negative Comparison

t(98)=0.32

p=.752

d=.06, [.00, .13]

t(98)=1.17

p=.244

d=.24, [.19, .29]

t(98)=1.15

p=.253

d=.23, [.17, .30]

t(99)=1.53

p=.130

d=.30, [.24, .37]

Recognition (Old/New)
List
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Prime
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative

t(98)=1.90

p=.060

d=.39, [.29, .48]

t(98)=0.61

p=.547

d=.12, [.02, .22]

t(98)=0.80

p=.425

d=.16, [.07, .26]

t(99)=0.33

p=.742

d=.06, [-.03, .16]
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Confidence
List
Control
Confession
DNA
Eyewitness
Fingerprint

Prime

Mean [95% CI]
3.98 [3.67, 4.29]
3.84 [3.56, 4.12]
3.44 [3.14, 3.74]
3.52 [3.19, 3.85]
3.49 [3.18, 3.81]
3.74 [3.40, 4.08]
3.38 [3.06, 3.70]
3.62 [3.27, 3.97]
3.32 [2.95, 3.69]
3.72 [3.37, 4.07]
3.41 [3.07, 3.75]
3.33 [2.96, 3.71]
3.62 [3.48, 3.66]

Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative
Neutral
Positive
Negative

Positive-Negative comparison
t(98)=0.36

p=.719

d=.07, [-.14, .29]

t(98)=1.55

p=.123

d=.31, [.09, .54]

t(98)=1.56

p=.122

d=.32, [.07, .56]

t(99)=1.20

p=.234

d=.24, [.01, .48]

Study 3b Free Recall Logistic Regression Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=654)=7.16, p=.306.
Nagelkerke R2=.022
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B

S.E.

No Prime

Wald

df

Sig.

3.503

2

.173

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Positive Prime

.263

.361

.530

1

.467

1.301

.641

2.639

Negative Prime

.622

.341

3.328

1

.068

1.863

.955

3.637

5.626

4

.229

Control List
Confession

-.978

.513

3.635

1

.057

.376

.138

1.028

-1.230

.529

5.411

1

.020

.292

.104

.824

Eyewitness

-.837

.505

2.747

1

.097

.433

.161

1.165

Fingerprint

-.918

.508

3.262

1

.071

.399

.147

1.081

-1.540

.367

17.588

1

.000

.214

DNA

Constant
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Study 3b Recognition Test Logistic Regression Alternate Analysis
X2(4, N=654)=4.82, p=.567.
Nagelkerke R2=.010
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B

S.E.

No Prime

Wald

df

Sig.

2.261

2

.323

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Positive Prime

.099

.207

.230

1

.632

1.104

.736

1.656

Negative Prime

-.203

.204

.991

1

.320

.816

.548

1.217

2.657

4

.617

Control List
Confession

.307

.351

.767

1

.381

1.359

.684

2.702

DNA

.232

.349

.441

1

.506

1.261

.636

2.501

Eyewitness

.000

.348

.000

1

.999

1.000

.506

1.979

Fingerprint

.298

.350

.727

1

.394

1.347

.679

2.675

Constant

.276

.283

.955

1

.329

1.318
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Appendix L
DRM Instructions and Memory Measures
DRM Primary Instructions:

Instructions (Beginning of survey): For this task, we are going to have you read several [list
of words]/[paragraphs] and ask you about them. Please do not write down anything from
the [lists]/[paragraphs], take notes, etc. – instead, remember the [lists]/[paragraphs] as
best you can.
Instructions (List, Study 1a, 1b, and 3b): Now we are going to have you read a list of words.
We want you to remember the words as best you can. When you ready to begin, press
“Next” and click the arrow on the video to begin the video.
Instructions (Story, Study 2a and 2b): Now, you will read a short paragraph. Again, please do
not write down anything in the paragraph
When you are ready to read the paragraph, proceed to the next page. You will have up to
two minutes to read the paragraph, at which point you will be automatically advanced.
Free Recall Test (Study 1a, 1b and Study 3b)
Instructions: Now, we will test your memory for the list you just read. You will have 2
minutes to enter as many words as you’re reasonably confident you saw on the list. After 2
minutes, the survey will advance to the next part.
[Participants are given 25 blanks to enter words they remember]
Free Recall Test (Study 2a and 2b)
Instructions: Below, please recall the paragraph as accurately as you can. To the best of
your ability, replicate the paragraph word-for-word, or as closely as you can.
[Participants are given an Essay Text Box to enter their response]
Recognition Test
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(continued on next page)
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(continued on next page)
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Participants are then presented with the following words:
Judge2
Balance3
Court2
Criminal2
Guilty1
Trial2
Elevator3

Zebra3
Blossom3
Develop3
Castle3
Jury2
Punishment4

Note: Order of words on the memory test was randomized, but the same across
participants.
Key:
1 Critical Lure
2 Old Word (word presented on the list)
3 New Word (random word, not on the list)
4 Weakly Associated Lure (the 15th word from our backwards association task; used as a
theme-relevant control)
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